“LETTER TO PHYLLIS” (2007-2010)
In these “Arguments on Aesthetics” Donizetti considers God to be “…the sole a priori form of the knowledge and foundation of every work of art.” The essay is in the form of a letter addressed to the famous American writer Phyllis A. Tickle, one of the nation’s leading experts and commentators on religion in the United States.
Phyllis Tickle is the author of “GREED” (Oxford University Press - New York, 2003), which - beginning with an examination of The Seven Deadly Sins by Mario Donizetti, in particular Greed *, and having taken into account that the artist has accompanied his pictorial creation with essays on the philosophy of art - invites readers to take a closer look at his complex aesthetic discourse.
From the publication of “GREED” to the present day, the meeting of two strong personalities has lead to the mutual exchange of opinions and clarifications on the great themes of life as well as on problems regarding ethics and aesthetics.

From the book summary of “GREED” (Oxford University Press - New York, 2003)
* “…Phyllis Tickle takes a long view of Greed, from St.Paul to the present, focusing particularly on changing imaginative representations of Greed in Western literature and art. Looking at such works as the Psychomachia, or “Soul Battle” of the fifth-century poet Aurelius Clemens Prudentius, the paintings of Peter Bruegel and Hieronymus Bosch, the 1987 film Wall Street, and the contemporary Italian artist Mario Donizetti, Tickle shows how our perceptions have evolved from the medieval understanding of Greed as a spiritual enemy to a nineteenth-century sociological construct to an early twentieth-century psychological deficiency, and finally to a new view, powerfully articulated in Donizetti’s mystical paintings, of Greed as both tragic and beautiful”

From Phyllis A. Tickle “GREED” (Oxford University Press - New York, 2003, pag. 47)
* “Mario Donizetti, the great Italian realist and polymath, will be remembered as our Da Vinci. More than any other contemporary Western visualist, Donizetti has understood that new imagination must always go back to ask from its ancients the footings for its own work. Saying that destruction of the past leads to silence, Donizetti teaches that what must come next is a reverence for whatever is left standing out of what has been…”

(Copyright MARIO DONIZETTI)
LETTER TO PHYLLIS

Dear Phyllis, dear friend,

I know that you believe, as do I, that to discover the truth is to find God.

But such an age-old problem calls for a somewhat urgent solution today.

The attributes of God, as the doctrine would have it, seem to me to have caused too many people to lose their faith nowadays. Thus we need to rethink the problem: what can make God rationally understandable; which truth is most likely to reveal His presence without creating doubts in our minds?

You know better than I do that Darwin is responsible for drawing our attention to the issue of “Creation”. If we compare his theory to the Book of Genesis and the history of (even recent) religious thought, it is hard to find a credible solution.

Just as there appears to be no solution to the problem of artistic Informalism, which I feel depends on a rational solution to the theological problem.

And so I am writing to you to set out what I think, in the hope that you will then tell me what you think of my thoughts.

It is obvious that some things move while others remain stationary, as St. Thomas Acquinas once said.

It is equally true that all things evolve with time and so
it is legitimate to believe that anything that fails to move at present will, necessarily, do so in time, since it is the passing of only time which changes things.

Thus we could assume that anything that is not currently “moving”, will receive the necessary impetus to do so from others capable of transmitting the required “motion” (like the wheels in a gear).

Thus, when we see something that is clearly moving, we must assume that it has received such an impetus. Because it is impossible for us to accept that in Nature some things move of their own accord, while others are only moved thanks to outside influences.

It is also clear that a thing cannot be both motionless and at the same time be in motion.

Thus the principle of contradiction is invaluable for us. An object cannot “be” and “not be” at the same time.

This said, if we accept that all things start moving after a previous period of immobility, we also need to accept the existence of a Prime Mover that originally transmitted the motion without itself having received it, as Aristotle argues. Therefore, the Prime Mover - not having itself received any motion, yet able to transmit it - must be the Creator (or source) of all movement.

Since this is the reality of movement, all would seem to be the creation of the Prime Mover and this Prime Mover is called God.

If we then accept the premise that certain things move while others are stationary, any attempt to deny the existence of the Prime Mover fails.

In fact, if the Prime Mover never transmits this motion, then given that things move, these would be constan-
tly in motion and everything would move simultaneously and forever. Things would be eternal.

But the opposite is true in practice, so the existence of a Prime Mover is fundamental.

And that’s not all: if we refuse to accept a beginning - and thus the creation of motion - then we cannot accept the transformation or evolution of things, from their start to their end.

So, if it is true that things gradually progress from their start to their end (i.e. from “before” to “after”), then it is necessary that the Creator exists, while there is no absolute certainty that the Creator exists if “movement” is continuous.

Indeed, the induction that God is the original transmitter of physical movement (the Prime Mover) due to the movement of physical things does not seem to prove the clear transcendence of God over physical things. This is because the argument that a motor - even if the Prime Mover - can physically move something without having a physical relationship with the thing that moves (now or at some point in the future) is not convincing.

The classic arguments deriving from the fact of the existence of the physical movement of things and their previous static state - even if they lead to God - do not automatically lead to His clear transcendence over physical things.

I feel that divinity, as defined by Aristotle, is physical (even if not “uncaused”), while the arguments forwarded by theologians to reconcile the Cause of movement and His transcendence over things are not convincing.

In fact, it is claimed that God created time, yet this
creation of time did not influence His eternity. But to start time from eternity is impossible if eternity is “all one”, i.e. not divided. The multiplicity of things, namely the physical and gradual nature of time, can not descend from eternity, which is all one. Eternity is not gradual or multiple and there is no moment at which something can begin.

Dear Phyllis, I have some other observations to make on the movement of physical things. I want to put forward what I feel to be their obvious consequences.

After close consideration of the state of things and motion, I am forced to deny the existence of the Prime Mover and thus God, if we assume that God is necessarily the Creator or Prime Mover, while the existence of God is certain if He is not the Creator.

In fact, we can see that - although this is not immediately evident and only becomes clear after careful analysis - that all things move, are in continuous motion and that nothing starts moving after a previous period of immobility. It can be easily accepted that knowledge of our external reality is built up of our experience of phenomena and their “quantity”. However, in order to count our experience of such phenomena, they need to be separated from each other. We do this by taking into account those moments when we have no perception of the phenomena, thus making them contiguous. But in reality, phenomena cannot be interrupted by pauses (i.e. “non-phenomena”), because in this case reality would not be continuous but interrupted (alternating) and thus non existent, which is obviously impossible.

Thus any external reality means that there can be no contiguous change from stasis to movement (i.e. from po-
tential to action), but this “change” is simply the result of our perception and memory.

Thus it seems obvious that there are no contiguous phenomena in reality: rather there is a single phenomenon that we split into numerable events on account of our limited senses. As a result, movement has no start.

Yet if all phenomena are continuous (though considered contiguous due to our consciousness and thus that of the world of which we are part), this simply means that there can be no absolute truth if we exclude either the quantifying of contiguous phenomena or the induction that they are continuous (i.e. a single phenomenon).

No mathematics, geometry or value can said to be true, unless this be a personal synthesis by me, as a perceiver of the contiguous nature and the external world, which I induce as being continuous. Such a synthesis is also possible if I always turn continuity into contiguity, which is my wont as this is the nature of the world. The existence of two truths - perceived contiguous truth and logical continuous truth - concerning time has led to an intolerable dualism in philosophy.

Immanuel Kant attempted a synthesis of subjective perception and reality by simultaneously combining continuity with a contiguous perception of categories prior to this.

However, by always reducing contiguous consciousness to a single reality (and excluding objective continuity), he imagined a purely subjective world. It seems to me, and tell me dear Phyllis if you feel the same, that the reality is like a fruit that has its separate parts, though we do not consider them as something separate from the reality of the fruit even when they do not appear to us as being that fruit.
As a result, contiguity and continuity together do not form the world. If either of these is missing, the world is objectively incomplete, which is to say non-existent. In this case not even an explanation of the existence of God is possible. We cannot conceive the world merely as contiguous (Kant’s subjective “before” and “after”), nor can we conceive the world as simply continuous in the manner of Hegel, without any contiguity. A merely continuous world means no contiguity and thus the disappearance of our physical nature and our consciousness. Whereas a simply contiguous world means there is no purpose or unity of continuous infinity.

It is simply impossible to believe in a continuous world without rational or contiguous phenomena. The many contiguous phenomena themselves form “one” continuous reality: rational continuity.

The immediate logical consequence without contiguity (and thus without sensoriality) is the non-existence of God and the principle of contradiction. In fact, if the phenomena (regardless of our contiguous perception) are continuous, then they must necessarily exist even in the absence of time and so we reduce them to not “being”. And we must also note that, in order to induce the existence of continuous movement, there must be movements of a lesser or greater degree (i.e. with contiguous values). Continuity of movement rationally destroys perceptible and gradual contiguity. So we need both the existence of stasis and contiguity and that of movement and its continuity. If it is true that all things gradually move, then this gradualness must be result of an unchanging value that can be split into contiguous parts. If this stasis (or immo-
bility) did not exist objectively, and hence we could not grade movement, everything would have the same rate of movement and so simply lose their mutual formal difference: the world would not exist. Similarly, if there were no continuous movement, the world would be simply a subjective perception.

Therefore, God can only exist if movement and stasis produce contiguous values not just in our rational sensory perception, but also in reality. God can only really exist as a reason for continuity if our contiguous perception of phenomena is real and not subjective.

If the continuity of phenomena really cancels out their contiguity, it would therefore cancel out the need for the objective existence of God, but also those very phenomena.

Let us pause for reflection (and amusement) before considering the problem of the existence of God as the creator of all reality. Let me tell you how I once saw a goose catch a butterfly.

THE GOOSE AND THE BUTTERFLY

Some time ago I saw a goose do an amazing thing.

The goose seemed somewhat distracted while a butterfly was flying around it. All of a sudden, and with astonishing precision, the goose opened its beak and caught it in a single move. This made me reflect: first, I thought that for the goose to catch a butterfly in flight it had to know that below is not above in accordance with the prin-
ciple of contradiction. Above and below were values that had a permanent objective relationship with the movement of its beak.

Again, I thought that the goose had to be able to distinguish its left from its right, to recognise the horizontal, vertical and diagonal planes. Thus the goose, so I thought, thought in terms of a square, triangle and circle, followed by the perimeter and circumference. These values I thought were needed to calculate the exact point where it could catch the butterfly. I also believed that the goose had to be able to rapidly calculate the changes in its personal geometric relationship with the butterfly in order to catch it. The goose, I thought, must know how quickly the butterfly and the environment change their relationship in order to pinpoint the right moment and point in space to catch it. The shape of the changing environment suggested a fixed point where it could catch the butterfly. I thought that the goose necessarily thought that the point where it would catch the butterfly was the idea of a stable thing. Namely a static representation: the idea of space.

I thought that the goose necessarily thought that the space was the static memory of time.

This space, so I thought, was seen by the goose as the unchanging shape of what was moving incessantly (i.e. continuously).

Its memory froze the actual movement to form a real image. Everything was seen as moving around their image frozen in its memory.

Later, the newspapers reported that a certain Perelman had demonstrated the “undisturbed march of progress” of the flow of reality, even if it seemed that our
observation could stop it and compromise it. I think both are true. Reality is rationally induced as being continuous and its “flow” (precisely because it is continuous) is unstoppable and so flows undisturbed. It is our memory of what we see that freezes it in the brain; the next observation cannot possibly be the same. Thus continuity is just as true as contiguity: one in the reality of time and the other in the reality of space (i.e. perception). “Some people think of physical models where the universe is a variety with eleven or perhaps thirteen dimensions”. I believe it to be possible to identify infinite dimensions in proportion to the possibility of stopping in the concept of contiguous space what, in time, is continuous. Thus our discontinuous memory of phenomena is not un-real or an invention of rational living beings, but an objective part of continuous reality. Both continuity and contiguity (i.e. time and space) are, I feel, produced for a single purpose. If space is not time (i.e. movement cannot be considered stationary), a goose could not establish a time/space relationship between itself and the butterfly. It could not catch it if space were not time. It could not pinpoint the right time and space to catch the butterfly.

Indeed, the scholars of geometry and mathematics could not find other dimensions of reality. That fixed point, I thought, is the metaphysical representation of the shape of temporal space, namely the image of time we call space. Again I thought that the goose, being able to catch a butterfly, could not believe that this was a fluke, as some would claim to deny the existence of purpose.

Between the decision to catch the butterfly and actually catching it, it is obvious that time was the passing from
the “before” to “after” spatial images. It was the certainty that space and time were the same. This fact was perhaps the first time I critically observed something that helped me understand whether what I thought could also be thought by a goose. This is not as ridiculous as it seems.

Thus I had the opportunity to conclude that the values shown by time (conceived as space) represent a form of reality. In other words, the values below, above, right, left, before and after are values of physical reality and not metaphysical values (in the sense that we normally give to the idea of metaphysics, i.e. non physical) but intra-physical and therefore the same for me for my every act and movement, just like the goose. Time and space suddenly appeared to me as the same form of all physical things, including me, the goose and the butterfly. It also seemed that these values were objective and stable, but in relation to a given project.

I noticed other events, which all led to the same conclusion. I found that if a voice had a great range, it would have a special value for those who need to hear from afar, but would be annoying for those standing close-by and so its special value was seen as a bad quality. Despite this, such a voice has its own objective personal and stable reality that cannot be used indifferently. In order for something to be confirmed as having a value for a given project, it must have a practical use and be useful to the development of the project. All values, therefore, even if objective, are not classed as values in their own right, but only in relation to a project. I realised that the objectivity of a value and its stability (aspects that are not of practical use or project-related) are only predicated by dreamers.
The values of correlation are considered by Idealists as “non-values”, because they say they evolve with the evolution of the correlation, but the values continue to be immobile precisely because they are important in the correlation. The needs of a project only lead to the discovery of the useful value through the correlation, in other words its purpose is found thanks to the correlation. Thus, the value accepts the correlation, which uses the value for a given purpose.

If the value of a voice with a great range evolves within the correlation, it could never be used nearby or at a distance. Indeed, the nearness and distance are correlations that are subsequent to the stable reality of the value of great range, even if the value is simultaneous to its use. Many people believe that values, in order to be held as such, should be considered separately from their use and they do not believe in the simultaneity of objective value and its use. If a value is project-related just twice, it means that it is not subsequent to its use, but since its use cannot be ignored (its use is required by the needs of the project), it is necessary that values and their use should be simultaneous.

Thus, even if things move and correlations change, the values involved in such correlations are immobile and at their service. If the horizontal and vertical planes were to evolve and become slanted, a goose could never catch a butterfly and artists could never paint portraits.

After such reflections on the extraordinary feat of the goose, I am convinced that the changing form of reality consists of correlations between values that do not change. Values are the real form that are highlighted by the need for their rational and contemporary use in the correlation.
That is why some people argue that values are not physical but go beyond, i.e. they are metaphysical. They are the immobile “Platonic” type, rather than physical and so subject to evolution. However, the physical form, even if turned upside down, would always have its top and bottom. These project-related values are still physical, the same physical form is involved and so go no further than the form, being part of the form itself. They are no more than the form or superior, as the Idealist would like to claim. We can mix infinite shades of grey on a painter’s palette using just two basic colours: black and white. It is precisely the stability of these that allow for the stability of infinite shades of real grey. Real values cannot go beyond their physical reality, the so-called metaphysical idea seems to me, therefore, a pure illusion compared with a physical value: black and white are considered metaphysically pure, but are non-real, because they are really only extremes.

The concept of purity is only a tool, a desire for perfection, while reality is contaminated. What I mean is that it is made up of different values that, upon being combined in a project, offer various layers for use. The difference between a pure (metaphysical) ideal point and a point at the extreme of its physical and optical dimension lies in the illusory and forced exclusion of those geometric parts that offer no immediate use of the special values from the physical and optical point of view of reality, yet are appreciated from a metaphysical point of view. Such geometric parts in relation to the idea of a metaphysical point can be called parasites. I think that the metaphysical idea of a point concerns the function that the physical point can play, provided there are no parasites.
The goose catches the butterfly at a real point (i.e. the physical space contaminated by other geometric shapes), yet it believes it has caught the butterfly at a pure metaphysical point that it previously considered useful in order to catch the butterfly. When we believe we have physically marked a given point using the needle in a compass, we form geometric shapes that contaminate (like parasites) that conceived point. The same can be said of a circle, square or line. Thus, just like a point, also the thought of pure movement is, in reality, contaminated by stasis and this is because the parasite produces the gradual changes that we believe to be the true nature of reality.

Yet I have often wondered, in order to verify my truth and that of the goose, what was the mechanism that induces us to think of such a point as being either physical - as if it were pure - or metaphysical, given that nothing is truly pure and everything is contaminated by parasites. Is it perhaps necessary that the idea of a pure or metaphysical point is, as Plato said, prior to the reality of the physical point that has been contaminated by parasites, meaning that I can recognize it as a point by virtue of the idea of a type of point (i.e. a metaphysical point)?

I believe I can answer this by saying that the urgency of the purpose of Nature means that I am not distracted by parasites which would otherwise impede the progress of my project. Nature has limited my power to analyse reality in both the infinitely small and infinitely large scales and has decided to give me a measurement of analysis and synthesis suited to the needs of my project.

Thus Nature makes me believe in the existence of a metaphysical point that is directly and immediately availa-
ble, because it represents the real physical point that goes no further than its usefulness for a project.

We must bear in mind that the optical analysis that pinpoints parasites at a physical point, will, if pushed to the extremes of our analytical capacity, show us that an optical point expands, proving how a point cannot exist unless as an association of particles united only by a purpose. A point is just that because there is a set purpose.

The optical perception of a physical point, therefore, is the perception of the purpose of its parts.

The purpose of these parts is evident in the possibility of their aggregation, which we call the metaphysical point.

Not only that, but each of these parts is, in turn, composed of elements that are complex in terms of space and time, thus making the idea of a geometric point extremely approximate. The optical reality of the physical point is “impure” and disappears when we want it to be “pure”. It is thus obvious that a physical point is a compound of disparate realities, that, when given a purpose, rise to unity (see note 1 Letter to Plato). And so it must be conceded that the physical point, like the metaphysical one, is a reality only in terms of its use.

Life is not a dream, as Calderon Della Barca would claim, because what we call the physical point is the visibility of the points in a project and these points are, in turn, the visibility of a total or global project. So what appears to us a physical point is, in fact, only the partial visibility of a real purposeful project and is part of the whole project-related purpose of the world. And then, thanks to the pure metaphysical point, we exclude all the impurities not involved in our project and we use the me-
taphysical idea as a guide to the success of our project - impure or physical - made up of the component parts.

Thus we can see that the idea of metaphysical reality with a conceived value of purity and totality is necessary for our existence, because only the ideal exclusion of the parasites in a physical point lets us use the space created by the components of such a point for a given project.

Without metaphysical purity no living being can plan any action in relation not only to an optical point, but also to a physical form. If the limitations in our analysis did not make the parasites in the physical point disappear, giving us the pure metaphysical idea, we would find it impossible to focus on a point because all the space (time being of a continuous nature) would not offer us any contiguous physical point to use.

What I am trying to say is that, in order to appreciate the reality of physical phenomena (which are continuous in time), we must make them contiguous or metaphysical in terms of space.

Dear Phyllis,

a new line of thought makes me extend the story of the goose and the butterfly.

Please try to imagine that my letter is as synthetic as a metaphysical point so you can succeed in physically reading it all.

If you watch the hand of a clock as it moves towards midday, you will immediately see that it gradually moves towards the vertical position and then, on passing this, is once again at an angle. Yet to move from the former to the slanting position it must really move from the vertical po-
sition and so the hand must really have been upright and not just as a result of our contiguous perception, but in objective reality (even though we can not appreciate this objectivity unless via perceptive contiguity). For the metaphysical idea (verticallity) to be possible, we need to stop the continuous time and translate it into contiguous space. This translation is simultaneous and so time and space appear to be identical. See how the vertical lines, being prior to our personal physical perception, are also prior to our metaphysical idea of verticallity and so guarantee the objective reality of the metaphysical idea of physical reality. Similarly, the contiguous movement resulting from physical perception guarantees the existence of continuous movement via induction. Thus, both the real continuity of time and the contiguity of its spatial images make the world simultaneous with its project and evolution. The distinction between the metaphysical and the physical (which calls for two different realities and an absurd nobility of the metaphysical over the physical reality) therefore disappears. It means that the claim “what actually exists is only the infinite” (Hegel, *Science of Logic*, Laterza 1996 page 139) can be refuted.

In the manner of Zeno, I want to try to clarify the difference, and thus the relationship, between the metaphysical idea of reality and the analytical idea or perception of physical reality. There is no doubt that Nature has established that Phyllis will live her set number of years. And yet, according to the metaphysical idea of time, Phyllis will never die. In fact, once Phyllis has lived half her physical time, she will still have the other half to live. That half that she has not yet lived. So when Phyllis has lived
half of the second half of her appointed time, she will still have half of the third half to live and so on ad infinitum: Phyllis will always have half the time left yet to live.

This means that the real time for Phyllis (i.e. the perceptible space of her physical body) is not Phyllis’s metaphysical time. However, without this metaphysical idea of time, Phyllis could not live her real space. Real time makes no sense if the idea of space is ignored. In order for real time to be lived in its finite aspect (i.e. space), it must be considered at the same time as such space. The metaphysical idea of time can not cancel out the physical reality of space as Idealists would make us believe. This is as false as the paradox that causes us to treat the metaphysical and the physical separately or unequally.

Having found that a goose, and not just mankind, gives purpose to life and that all existence is project-related and has a purpose, I thought that the goose might consider every physical value to be metaphysical. Conversely, a physical value would have no use in catching a butterfly.

Thus the so-called pure values of an Idealist (the so-called metaphysical values, which claim to be the object of the science of all sciences “notwithstanding all experience”) are just a tool of the physical experience of every living being, while its molecules, atoms and particles are included in its physical life. Time and space were not seen as the properties of things for Immanuel Kant, but things were in time and in space. In this dimension, space would cancel out the dimension of the space of things which, thus deprived of their space, would become a void: the Idealists are of this view. Physical things are, for the Idealist, just “ballast” when they are not what disappears in the
metaphysical infinite. But I believe that here we have seen that time and space are properties of things. Even though, if we fail to turn what is physical into metaphysical by rational thought (i.e. if we cannot translate into our language the language of reality), then we can never use reality for any project. If we had no metaphysical idea, we would end up feeling useless and lost.

I thought these could be useful reflections. But they could also have been mere digressions on the catching of the butterfly if the great physiologist Joseph Moruzzi had not demonstrated, through scientific experiment, that the structure and thus the function of the brain is dictated by sensory perceptions. This means it is certain that the synthesis of time and space is not "a priori", but is dictated by physical objectivity.

By observing the behaviour of the goose after its success, I noticed that instead of feeling indebted to the cheated reality, it seemed (by how it walked, its posture, confidence and air of decision) that it was filled with pride. It acted as though it were the centre of the world. It obviously thought that butterflies exist only to be caught. It believed itself to be blessed by God and believed to be God’s ally against all butterflies; again, if God had not made this possible, it would have certainly thought that God was unnecessary. In part, its pride was understandable because the ability to steal with dexterity meant it would survive. But geese, like men, make mistakes and confuse the mechanism with the purpose of the mechanism. Pride affects all living beings who aim to enjoy a life free of “ballast of the flesh”. It seems to me that the personal lives of all living beings, like the line of a circle, ends
where it starts: in the Glory of God. In other words, in the Glory of Reason that transcends the purpose of all personal lives.

I must mention, at the end of this, my reflection, what happened after the death of the goose. The goslings wondered whether they could survive since their mother could no longer feed them with butterflies. With their hunger a light was switched on. It was the light of the translation of physical reality into a metaphysical idea. The goslings, with their baggage of genetic knowledge began to project new physical realities, thus overcoming the unpredictable difficulties of existence. It was the same impulse or divine reason that killed the mother. The metaphysical ideas became servants of physical life. The translation of the gradual impure physical form into a pure and absolute metaphysical idea, to the ultimate and essential benefit of real life (i.e. the satisfaction of their hunger) became a success.

GOD AS SOLE “A PRIORI” FORM OF KNOWLEDGE AND FOUNDATION OF ALL WORKS OF ART

Dear Phyllis,

I now want to share with you (at least as far as I can and in more detail) what I have been thinking for some years about God and the nature of Art, which I feel depends on how you view the existence of God.

Thus, I believe that those who deny the objectivity and
stability of the physical values of Nature and who think that knowledge is based on subjective categories, decided *a priori* and not the result of empiric experience, must necessarily be ignorant of the objective value of Beauty. If Beauty, both natural and artistic, were decided by subjective taste, then even degrees of Beauty (more or less beautiful) would not be open to debate and, therefore, to being placed in a historical perspective. If the beauty of a form were judged according to personal taste, it could not, then, be criticised or the subject of historical development.

The starting point for the subjective theory is, as you know, Immanuel Kant’s critical works. This philosopher, after making knowledge subjective thanks to his famous *a priori* categories, believed he could restore the objective value to aesthetic judgements by means of a non-existent common-sense. It is established that common-sense does not exist. Each of us is unique and unrepeatable. What unites us can not be any common *a priori* categories, but only our purpose, which assumes a unique and unrepeatable personality. Thus the value of Beauty cannot depend on our personal senses and then be objective due to a commonly shared need.

In his philosophical theory, Kant makes a distinction between the two forms of aesthetic judgement: “pure opinion”, when the object is a form in the total absence of any knowledge about its purpose and its function; and “impure opinion”, whose impurity is caused by our utilitarian interest in the form in question. Kant claims there are two forms of aesthetic judgement and thus two forms of Beauty: “free” Beauty, judged without any knowledge of the function of its form, and “adherent” beauty, judged
according to the degree of perfection or imperfection of the function of its form.

Yet I think it is impossible to judge the attribute of the form if we do not know the function of the form. It seems to me that the only possible aesthetic judgement of a form is through knowing the perfection or imperfection of the function of a form. I believe that the only possible aesthetic judgement comes from more or less perfect, or appropriate, adherence of the form to its function. “Free” Beauty seems to be non-existent and the beauty of a form is linked, as I have already said, to the more or less perfection of the function of the form in relation to its purpose.

Today Kant’s *a priori* forms of time and space appear to be mere old knowledge acquired *a posteriori* by our fore-fathers and codified by our genes. They seem, and not only seem to be synthetic *a priori*, but are just prior to our current plastic experience.

Our genetic legacy, namely atavistic taste, is what Kant mistakenly believed to be aesthetic. I believe that the aesthetic judgement of our ancestors about what is perfect and imperfect, transmitted by our genes, is for us a judgement of taste because it ignores our own views of current perfection and imperfection.

Since nothing is *a priori*, we (or our fore-fathers) must express the form of space and its attributes of beauty or ugliness *a posteriori*. We must also note that a judgement of taste should not be open to rational criticism because it is encoded by our genes.

To complicate what is really a simple matter when it comes to our judgement is the fact that the genetic judgement of taste (eminently indisputable) insinuates itself in
our personal aesthetic judgments which, by their very na-
ture being rational, are then open to criticism. But it is
difficult for us to distinguish between the nature of these
two judgements because it seems to us, as it seemed to
Kant, that each is as important as the other. When the
taste gene is dominant, we have difficulty in seeing current
aesthetics.

It is, however, certain, dear Phyllis, that if the genetic
approach agrees with current aesthetics, we become upset
and emotional because it makes us enjoy the max personal
potential for life, just as it did our ancestors. Art, to me, is
the victory of experience over rationality. And the judg-
ment about what is beautiful or ugly (i.e. the positive and
negative sides of life) cannot be the result of merely sub-
jective atavistic taste. Nor can it be the result of a simple
rational judgement of current perfection or imperfection.

At this point we must clarify that the rational perfec-
tion or imperfection of a form does not concern any ideo-
logical or religious, ethical or political values and so on.
The perfection of a form can also be harmful for those va-
lues. Artistic perfection, or perfection of form, is simply
what reveals the technical and rational skills that improve
our current conditions of life. I feel that the aesthetic be-
auty of a bad form consists in the perfect representation
of its ugliness. The aesthetic ugliness of a beautiful shape
is imperfection in representing its beauty. The aesthetic
ugliness of a bad form is the imperfect representation of
its ugliness. The beautiful representation of a beautiful
form is the perfect representation of its beauty. So the be-
autiful and perfect representation of an immoral ideology
is possible, and vice-versa.
Dear Phyllis,

a man who barely listened to the arguments of others once said: “if it is true that artistic beauty is all that is perfect and suitable for its purpose, then a representation of St. Joseph or of the Sacred Heart that lead to prayer is, of necessity, artistic”. But here we can counter by saying that such a representation is only artistic in relation to the theme that leads to prayer. In other words, it is artistic in terms of the “supreme interests of the spirit” (Hegel), but the perfection or imperfection of an art form does not depend on the themes of Art, as Hegel believed, but on the technique with which the form of the objects in question is represented by analogy.

To choose the best lifestyle is an aesthetic choice for all living beings. To be able to distinguish between the best and the worst is to distinguish between Good and Evil. Therefore, if we adopt the same theme, the same subject and the same object, the work that shows them in the best light (and not the worse) will be considered beautiful (i.e. in view of the function of their form, whether the form be moral or immoral, good or bad by nature). This is impossible if the aesthetic judgement is not rational and entrusted exclusively to subjective taste or linked to the interests of the spirit. With the discovery of the origin of the formation of man’s central and peripheral nervous system and the transmission of genetic usefulness for the species through DNA, I think that even Immanuel Kant would no longer have forwarded the *a priori* categories today, but only their ancestral formation through *a posteriori* experiences and Hegel would have found the spirit in the interests of the flesh.
However, this question concerns the start of man’s desire for knowledge. The start of man’s formation is more problematic.

Indeed, for empiric knowledge (i.e. *a posteriori* or retrospective knowledge) of external reality to occur, each individual requires the existence of will and the instrumental possibility of knowledge. Therefore, even before knowing, an individual (since he or she will only know *a posteriori*) must have a purposeful internal desire to know *a priori*. This desire has to be simultaneous with the start, otherwise the individual could not give a purpose to his knowledge.

We see that knowledge is selective and project-related, thus with a purpose. We can thus imagine the start of empiric knowledge that admits the existence of an active *a priori* condition, which is the mother of each individual, prior to the formation of different individuals. Recent studies carried out on our nervous system and the behaviour of acephalous beings have shown that this purposeful behaviour is common to all. Even single-cell organisms, such as amoebae, give purpose to their actions in a highly logical manner, albeit without rationality (see *Letter to Plato*).

As a result, we can also assume the existence of a logical living structure prior to single-cell organisms and so argue that this logical behaviour (i.e. with a logical purpose) is the intimate true nature of all existence, including subatomic particles.

Let us suppose, then, that prior to the formation of individuals with given personal purposes, there were a single form of universal energy with a single purpose, which means that the universe consisted of only one individual: the formation of different individuals with different pur-
poses could therefore be conceived as a coming-together with the purpose of obtaining parts of energy. The parts, thus united for a new project, may have triggered a process of proportionate interest for each part and the rest of the world. If so, they have enriched the Primary Energy with a new evolutionary project and strengthened the feeling of belonging to their one shared origin.

The personal projects could not then be in opposition to the project-related needs of the Primary Energy that formed them and so we may suppose that the Primary Energy needed the new projects to meet its own intimate need for purposeful existential affirmation and not because the energy was incomplete, but because its nature would be future-oriented. Thus it would have been its very completeness that led it to creating individuals with new projects. We could view such individuals as a form of organizational change within the energy.

This process of uniting parts of energy and sharing a new project can still be seen today: the individuality of cells is made up of molecules, which in turn are formed by atoms and these by purposeful particles that can be split until all that remains is an non-describable Primary Energy that is always formal and purposeful, being of a physical nature.

Thus, all phenomena and individuals could be seen as parts of a single phenomenon, or individual energy. The origin of the formation of individuals may be the same as today. Everything originates from the common energy. Personal energy dies and still joins the Primary Energy today in order to be used again later in another form with a different purpose. This seems to be an obvious return
to the common energy for a purpose. Perhaps this was the case of the very first individuals.

Today we are all capable of understanding how water is formed by the purposeful union of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom. This lets us understand just how a complex individual and a simple water molecule should be seen as a society of individuals sharing a single purpose.

The Primary Energy does not die when individuals die or are formed with the energy of others.

The awareness of their personal purposes, or awareness of their own potential, is the awareness of the existence of the purpose of the world and thus the awareness of the existence of God. It is also the starting point for a desire for knowledge. To me, this awareness seems to be the only a priori condition for a posteriori knowledge. It is therefore necessary that this awareness in the Primary Energy has always existed and is the memory, or code, for the formation of every individual, free to perfect its existence through knowledge.

Therefore I see God as the need for knowledge at all levels, including subatomic particles. God seems to me to be the only a priori possibility and starting point of all knowledge.

Every individual has the certainty of its own energy potential that is nothing but the certainty of the existence of God as the reason for its own energy potential. Especially because this potential is freely project-related. If the energy were merely mechanical, then, and only then, God would be nothing, but the creativity of projects makes the reason for the projects necessary, and this is God.
But God cannot have projects, being the reason for such projects.

And thus also energy promotes personal projects without pre-establishing them and this is its project. Even the death of individuals and the extinction of personal projects is, without doubt, the project of energy and this distinguishes it from the Reason for each project, so reducing pantheism to a mistake.

Therefore, perfections and imperfections (namely efficiency and inefficiency) are linked to personal projects. These values are objective if they are related to a project and thus enable them to be appropriate or inappropriate to that project.

For example, a hare-lip is not deliberately wanted by an unborn child but is only negative in terms of the project for the human race. A hare-lip is, in itself, perfect provided it is desired by the Primary Energy, which is not purely aimed at the project of the human race. Thus the ugliness and inefficiency of a hare-lip are objective imperfections in the vital project of mankind. But that form, being wanted by the Primary Energy without any interest in the vital human project is perfect. Those who accept as true the theory of Kantian aesthetic judgement should not have any reason to declare that a hare-lip is ugly, nor that it is beautiful, since Kant reduced Beauty and Ugliness to a judgement of taste. Indeed, Kant wondered why the foliage of plants is considered beautiful and answered by saying that it is beautiful because we like it, which is like saying that foliage would be ugly, even if perfect for its purpose if we did not like it. Instead it is obvious that what we like is perfect for its purpose and so we call it beautiful.
Likewise, when we do not like a shape that is perfect for its purpose, this cannot mean that it is not beautiful, but simply contrary to our taste. It is easily understandable that we may not like a spider non account of it having been seen as negative by our ancestors for our life’s project, but it is equally impossible to deny its wonderful beauty since it is wonderfully perfect in terms of its own life’s project.

So, if Beauty is only that which is perfect in terms of its function and form, the Kantian and Idealist dualism of Beauty is nonsense. If Beauty is physically objective, there is no credibility for the judgement of taste as an aesthetic judgement on which Kant’s artistic Informalism is based. Moreover, the objective physicality of Beauty makes the instability of values vain. The modern Kantian school of thought denies the existence of objective values, but the negation of such values is also the negation of the value of negation.

The so-called modern school of thought turns the negation of values against itself. As already said in my Letter to Plato (note 1), I must mention Joseph Moruzzi’s experiment, which proved in a highly scientific manner that the form of reality outside the brain (through the peripheral nervous system of our senses) builds the structural form of the brain.

Thus we think of things as things in terms of their use. To think of things is to repeat things. There is nothing in the intellect which has not first been in the senses, says St. Thomas Aquinas. The school of realism was centuries ahead of today’s scientific truth and philosophical modernism seems false to us.

Those who believe they think of reality in a subjective
manner should not, as it were, eat objectively, because if the thought of eating is not objective, so too will be the mere thought of eating. It is impossible for doing and the thought of doing to disagree. To accept life means lying when we claim we do not think of it objectively.

The values are, however, stable when seen in terms of a purpose. Only if we deny their purpose, could we then - and only then - fail to acknowledge their objectivity. If, for example, we do not recognise that a hare-lip is contrary to the purpose of a lip (i.e. to make nutrition feasible), then that lip could be seen as perfect and therefore beautiful. But I must point out that even a hare-lip, which is negative for the life of a person and therefore ugly for us, having been wanted by the Primary Energy and being useful for the death of the person who has one, is therefore perfect in terms of the purpose for which it was generated. Thus, it is beautiful in terms of the death of a person. But we say that it is ugly, when nature leads to a death; beautiful, when it leads to a birth. Even so, it is a mistake to think that death is ugly, as it is perfect for its purpose, which is also that of birth.

What I want to say, at the risk of repeating myself, is that the beauty of a form is simply whatever is perfect for its purpose. So it is clear that the work of Nature can never be ugly, while the work of mankind requires that it does not shorten his life and is therefore beautiful if it satisfies this requirement and ugly or bad if it leads to his death. Thus a work of art, if technically perfect, enhances human capacity and so highlights man’s potential, meaning that we can call it beautiful. It is therefore logical to say that it is ugly or bad if the opposite is true.
But to return to our theme, we must remember that Nature (what Hegel calls the finite that “disappears into the infinite”) actually exists and its transience is simply a return to eternity in another form. So a great magician is needed to make it disappear. We must never tire of saying that what exists, what is actually there, makes its opposite disappear and, in this case, the opposite is Hegel’s infinite.

Dear Phyllis, the “old philosopher” as you have called him, fills me with tenderness when I’m not angry with him. How can Hegel, being “finite” make himself disappear and then promote something about which he cannot know anything since he has disappeared? That infinite also makes Hegel disappear and so how can Hegel then give existence to anything? Someone who is not there cannot say that something else is there. However, on the contrary, it is obvious that any “finite” object (all forms of Nature or amounts of energy) has a personal and gradual manner of existing infinitely and on a continuous basis. And every individual (i.e. every finite form) is moved by a purpose.

It is therefore necessary to admit the existence of an entity that is neither what Hegel calls an infinite “being”, or pure spirit, which would make the physical world disappear, nor just the physical or mechanical infinite without any purpose, because the pure physical being would, in that case, cancel itself, just as the pure spirit cancels itself. We must admit the existence of physical purpose as the only reality.

This purpose we can also call “spirit” because our rationality distinguishes it from the physicality inert. We distinguish between solids and fluid without expecting that these have a different nature. Thus God can be conceived
as the Reason for the existence of physical purpose (i.e. physical reality). And so it is not possible that God is the author of the project of the energy, otherwise individuals would not have free purpose. Nature would not evolve, but would be imprisoned by predetermined immobility. And we can not accept that a divine plan can evolve in order to be improved, because then we should admit that creation is imperfect or incomplete and absurdly expected by God to improve itself.

The omnipotence of God can not be admitted if there is imperfection and incompleteness in its nature, otherwise we would need to admit the possibility of God having limitations. In that case, we should admit that Nature works alongside God. We would have to admit that God is not God.

Mere change, even without considering the evolution of God’s work, excludes divine creation. Some theologians - contrary to what is claimed here - argue that the omnipotence of God does, indeed, allow for God to expect Nature to improve itself through evolution. This means we must assume that Nature recognises its own perfection, but this cannot be true because Nature exists in uncertainty, dominated by fatal errors to the detriment of the beings that form it. According to these theologians, God allowed room for such fatal errors that would irreversibly affect life and so work against Himself. In this case, God’s creation would appear pointless. But in the Book of Genesis it is written that God, after seeing His Creation, said that “it was good.” It seems incomprehensible to us that God would create a good thing, which already contained imperfection and the reason for its disappearance.
Furthermore, if we believe that eternity is the only measure of God, namely that the succession of time can be summed up as absolute non-temporality, it must mean that His Creation has simultaneously disappeared at the time of its very creation. In other words, Creation and its extinction are simultaneous and thus the same. Moreover, if we accept the fact of Creation, God would therefore be pleased with the evil that evolution promotes for the losers. The ephemeral good to the detriment of the losers suggests that God is an atrocious or terrible being, as has long been thought. God cannot be involved in atrocities that not only men commit against their fellow men, but all living beings commit by killing their own kind to the exclusive benefit of their existence. It makes one think that if God is the Creator and omnipotent - while not wishing evil, as St. Thomas Acquinas says, and again, as St. Thomas Acquinas says, actually allows it - then God is the accomplice of Evil because, despite being omnipotent, He allows it. So God can not be the Creator.

I wish it were possible to accept the freedom of individuals and the simultaneous presence of God. Let’s consider this theory: God is not the actual author of the Design (or project) for living beings, but is the Need for their project. A project that can also be their extinction and not necessarily their affirmation. It is not credible that God wanted the affirmation of men based on blind selfishness typical of the cruelest and fiercest violence against other beings. Nor can He be the Creator of the painful diseases that accompany some men for all their life, only dying after slow drawn-out agony. It is said that this is intended as a warning to the mad and guilty, but even if this were
true, why should the innocent be used to warn the guilty when the omnipotence of God could itself warn them without causing tragic unhappiness for the good folk?

Dear friend, these further considerations have continued to torment me until I managed to find some form of relief by thinking that God could not be the Creator. The main reason is this: if man (or Creation) is in the image and likeness of God, then nothing is less similar to God than movement, because Nature is only movement and God is only immobility. Thus God is not the cause, but the unassailable reason for Nature’s existence. Someone suggested that if God were not the Creator, then His existence would be useless. However, we have seen that everything moves with a purpose and so we say that everything moves for a reason. But since all that moves eventually stops, the reason for the end of its movement cannot be the same as its beginning (i.e. its movement). So the reason for everything that moves and ends goes beyond the personal movement and end of movement. And this is God who transcends individual movement and the end of movement.

Some people argue that the reason for movement, namely existence, is the very movement or existence itself and so there is no reason to the end of movement or existence, given that the end of movement cannot, by necessity, have the same reason as movement. In other words, two opposing realities cannot have the same personal same reason and so it is not sufficiently rational that what moves actually moves by itself, because, since it can move by itself, it cannot disappear by itself, as in order to do this it must have two contrary reasons.

What I mean is that the reasons for each particular exi-
istence or non existence can not be oppose each other, otherwise they are simply not reasons. So it is necessary that there is only one reason for all the individual reasons, which does not contradict itself. It is necessary that there is a reason for all the special reasons given, otherwise every individual reason would have the same value as a contrary reason or the reason of others. Ultimately, it is incomprehensible that there are converse reasons. The world would be in contradiction with itself. So each particular individual existence has its first and ultimate Reason in the existence of a reason that transcends the world.

To communicate with you, dear Phyllis, I must repeat it again: any individual existence has its own reason to exist and every extinction has the reason for its individual extinction, and so the reason for each individual life is not the individual reason for each death.

As I have already said, this presupposes the existence of a reason that transcends every life and every death. Maybe a metaphor can help me to communicate with you: personal purposes are like batons used to pass onto others their project. Everyone passes on his purpose objective to another at death, though this does not imply a goal as is the case in relays in a sports stadium, as the world is infinite and without a goal. If the personal purposes had a goal, then these, once the goal has been reached, would make the world disappear into thin air, as the existence of the world depends on the active purpose of living beings who inherit the purpose of all. The purpose is in the world, but is not of the world. The purposeful beings who constitute the world perish with their personal goals, but the first and ultimate reason for their purpose goes be-
yond them, otherwise their purpose would not be handed on to others at their death. Only if existence ends, then the purpose of the existing beings would have a goal in extinction and only in that case would the purpose of living beings be immanent, because their goal would be in their own purpose or in themselves. Yet the world is infinite and existent, so can never be non-existent. This means that personal purposes are handed onto others without any goal and so they must be transcended by a divine reason.

Physicists would argue that purposes do not exist because the components of the physical world on an atomic level would behave at random. Subatomic phenomena, according to physicists, would behave inconsistently with the constancy of their causes. But first - given the necessity of the free purpose of every being and a genetic, or transmitted, reason which ensures an effect (even if it does not determine it) - the pre-configuration of a recurrence of a phenomenon is unreasonable. For this reason too, every creation that might be the cause for the constancy of such causes would disappear, as would the possibility of identical phenomena. It is understandable that the same phenomenon could not happen again, because the same causes cannot be repeated. It thus becomes impossible to have the existence of two identical phenomena, just as it is impossible, for the same reason, that the phenomena occur at random. If phenomena occurred at random, they could be repeated, as the physicists claim.

Some scientific researchers, such as Monod, while accepting as true the law of causality, consider the existence of random events to be true, thus contradicting themselves by recognising said law and its non existence.

41
Despite this contradiction, research as such can only implicitly admit the existence of what we call causes, today called “conditions”. A condition is a concurrence of several causes. Without causes, namely without the knowledge of a particular phenomenon that precedes the even only partial knowledge of the phenomenon taking place, research would have no meaning. This is true despite the fact that the truth about the sequence of phenomena (namely the logic or consecutive nature of the phenomena) is to be regarded as approximate. Just as, for example, the idea of point is approximate, because the rationalised phenomena and subsequent ones have several cross-causes that unpredictably condition them.

So the logical succession of the phenomena is not fully adequate for rational codification of a law, if this is to be pure (i.e. without parasites that make it rationally approximate). However, it is impossible that any law, albeit incomplete in its description, uses even just one random phenomenon. Randomness is simple ignorance of the logical purpose of a phenomenon. It is ignorance of the perception of a phenomenon before the next one that is evaluated as to its purpose. Some geneticists mistakenly believe in the existence of randomness. The cornerstone of this conviction would be the “fact” that the same genetic character can be formed with the assistance of a single gene as well as with a combination of several. But the existence of two identical characters is impossible and this can be deduced as follows: given that the current status of a form is due to its earlier evolution, for a form to be identical to another it must have had the same previous evolution (i.e. the same parallel birth, the same develop-
ment in time and the same purpose, and so not a single different movement). Two identical forms must have the same contacts with the external environment. And this is impossible for a geometric reason.

Indeed, the spatial/temporal ratio of a form cannot have the same identical temporal space as another form. Where there is the space of a form, there can be no space and time for another form. Where there is one thing that there cannot be another. We must remember also that, so that the phenomena can be distinguished between each other, they must be separated in time by the suspension of our perceptive activities. I believe this separation or division into parts of the actual single phenomenon - as I think I’ve already told you - happens with a non-recordable suspension of our attention. So we call the rational moments of reality “phenomena”. Our attention, or analysis, reduces the continuous movement of reality into contiguous images, alternated by stasis. And as it is impossible in reality that there is a sequence of contiguous phenomena (i.e. a lack of phenomena alternating with the perceived phenomena), it follows that two repeated and identical phenomena are impossible.

As I believe that the analytical parts of reality are the rationality of the total phenomenon, I also think it is necessary that a dual reality (i.e. two identical phenomena) are not necessary for the economy or totality of a single phenomenon. Likewise, also the problem of whether two strokes of lightning can occur at the same time must be said to be impossible. If two strokes of lightning are formally (that is spatially) different, they will also be temporally different. The mere diversity of form of two strokes
of lightning makes it certain that they each have their own personal temporality. Even if their complete personalities are unknown due to the inadequacy of our analysis, the personal temporality of a phenomenon cannot be identical or simultaneous to another phenomenon because every phenomenon has a personal space. For example, glaciation is a part of the total phenomenon that can be described as parallel to fire, but it follows that both glaciation and fire must have different personal temporality. If it were not so, then fire and glaciation could not be distinguished. In fact, what is identical in time and space cannot be described as being different.

Having already said that space is the rationality of time, this very time presupposes the same space. It is the Kantian mistake that makes this truth difficult for us. Indeed, Kant imagines that space and time are not the attributes of things, are not the things themselves but a priori forms regardless of the things involved. Kant thinks, as I have already said, that things are in time and in space. If that were the case, two strokes of lightning could occur at the same time, could co-exist simultaneously in time, yet in a different space. But in reality the various strokes of lightning are parts of the same phenomenon and so cannot be identical with respect to both their spatial form or duration, and hence cannot be simultaneous. The simultaneity of two forms would only be possible in time, but if things are time, it is clear that one thing being one thing and not another, its time will also be so. Thus everything is, in reality, united by its purpose to others, but each is itself unique and unrepeatable (see note 1 Letter to Plato, the problem of “one over many”).
What may lead us to think about the possible temporal simultaneity of two phenomena is our ability to unify them ideally for a purpose. Our relationship with phenomena makes us believe that we are the centre of the world. The phenomena, in connection with our purpose, may seem simultaneous and therefore also with us, because our and their purposes are simultaneous and so the phenomena may all be simultaneous in purpose, but on the condition that they are personally different and perceived as being contiguous. If there is no physical diversity of the phenomena, then their personal purposes would be missing and so also the reason that transcends personal purposes. In that case, the phenomena could not be either simultaneous or contiguous. So if you wanted to cancel the contiguous and make it “non existent”, the continuous infinity would cancel itself because nothing would reveal it and nothing would require its existence.

The fact of being does not in itself reveal existence. Pure infinite is total absence of self. Only the finite renders the infinite true, even if there is no conciliation between the two, but solitude. But even the word “solitude” is inadequate for the pure infinite because solitude presupposes the existence of another from which it is segregated. So the contiguous finite, in its ability to configure the continuous infinite, guarantees the existence of the continuous infinite. When we consider something contiguous as being contiguous, in reality we think of the continuous split into parts thanks to analytical perception. The parts are simultaneous to the existence of the whole and so we can see how the whole can be rationally divided into contiguous parts and how the two representations are
in fact one reality seen from two different points of view. We can also understand how the simple is compound and how the “one” is “many”.

If the world appears to us as consisting of several phenomena (countable), this is due to the fact that the individual, wanting to represent the world, splits the world into static or contiguous parts in order to remember their numerical sequence, as I’ve already said.

Hence we think of the first as being a potential of the “after” and then the same “after” as the potential of what exceeds it in numbering.

The logical consecutive order between potential and action (i.e. between “before” and “after”) is nothing but a description of the occurrence of a continuous phenomenon (as explained above) and therefore can not have opposing parts. It follows that every living being, such as the seed of a plant, is a being that is the plant. The seed is a part of the plant whether it is fertilised not fertilised. The life of the seed predates the life of the plant, but each plant exists prior to his seed. It seems to us that the seed is potentially a plant, but also the plant is potentially a seed. So the seed and plant are really taking place simultaneously, even if (rationally) the seed and the plant have a personal time and form, but the passage from one to another is not a switch from potential to action, but take place simultaneously. If the seed is destroyed and fails to become the plant, it simply means we cannot roof our house with the wood of the plant that that seed would have produced. This means that, if possible, it is best not to destroy the seed, nor is it a good idea to destroy the plant and his seed.

But if we attempt to apply the principle of legality (i.e.
that which allows or forbids our destroying the seed or plant), the problem of determining when the seed is not worth the plant and vice-versa arises. In other words, when it is reasonable to destroy a seed and when a plant. And the idea that the seed is only worth the same as the plant once fertilised (as it will then become a plant) is irrelevant here, because each non-fertilised seed is waiting to be fertilised, meaning it is in the same condition of a plant that is waiting to produce seeds. So a non-fertilised seed and the plant are a single being, even if we can describe the seed and plant separately for descriptive needs and even if it seems repugnant to give the same value to a plant as to a non-fertilised seed. The difference lies simply in their practical usefulness for our project.

Now I feel I have to summarise what I have said because I feel I have been talking at cross purposes.

SUMMARY

Dear Phyllis, as you can see, my observations on the condition of things in terms of movement allow for the impossibility of a convincing idea of God as Creator. It is therefore necessary to suggest removing His attribute of “Creator” in order to affirm the mere existence of God. This removal can lead to the certainty that God exists and so scepticism would have won.

The prior existence of God with respect to the various forms of the world must become priority coeternity, since
God is the reason of the world. God appears to be the reason for the diversity of things. The certainty of His earlier existence starts with the fact that everything exists for a reason. If the purpose of even the smallest of physical mechanisms is certain and transcends every smaller mechanism, it is equally certain that the purpose and transcendence of all the mechanisms also exist. In fact, if a mechanism had no reason to exist (i.e. no purpose), it would be passive (i.e. without movement). So it is certain that as I exist for a reason, everything else must exist for a reason and this reason might be called God. The existence of purpose gives us the certainty that the purpose is the reason for existence.

Dear Phyllis, I am sure that you are reading this letter patiently, because you wish me well. I would therefore repeat myself in this summary: the reason for the physical world may be thought of as being not earlier or the cause, but simultaneous, and therefore, coeternal, but of priority. In fact, every living being feels it exists in its own right even if it ignores those of others. So the reason for every life is an overriding and undeniable need. Thus to feel the reason for our own existence is to feel the reason for existence of God and, that is, feel His presence.

This feeling is of the utmost importance for our physical existence, because, if our physical existence did not feel this priority, it would be reduced to passivity and thus non existence. We could therefore say that God, being the reason for our physical existence with purpose, is His presence in us even if He transcends us. But if we attribute creation to God, we will conceive in God the power to create.
Some people ask whether God is not merely a creation of man. If this were true, then mankind would be *a posteriori* to the reason for their existence, which means that they existed without a reason before inventing God. That is impossible. World religions naively represent God as the creator of Good and Evil. This romantic approach leads to the belief that certain religions are superior to others and hence certain civilizations and men are superior to others. It also leads to the belief that God can enter into alliances with some, which is equivalent to inventing a God that only exists in someone’s interest. If we were to think that God has preferences, we would have to admit that God loves Energy more than anything else, given the relatively brief lifespan of living beings compared to the energy from which we come and to which we return. But this is not the case. All living beings are capable of immobilising continuous movement in their memory and therefore have an awareness of their purposeful existence. This wonderful opportunity shared by all living beings is aimed at an awareness of their existence and so is not a coincidence.

Therefore, we can be absolutely certain that God does not favour anyone and anything, as He is the reason for everything. Even though the reason for a mechanism requires the existence of the mechanism, we can all clearly see that it is not the actual mechanism. God thus has no relationship with the various mechanisms, even if they have a set purpose. These are transcended by the reason of their existence.

As a result, every physical analogy made concerning God fails to match His transcendence. All the attributes of God, precisely because they are analogies of physical
attributes, do not reveal, but actually hide the existence of God.

Just one idea is suitable for God and precisely because it is not an attribute: it is the instinctive but inscrutable and indescribable reason for the world. The immediate and invariable answer to the persistently asked question as to why we need a reason for the world is that we can clearly see that everything always exists for a functional purpose, that is for a reason. Because it is not possible, as I have already said, that one function, or individual reason, is the same reason and function shared by others and so there has to be a reason for all functions and individual reasons.

Good and Evil are freedoms of living beings and reside within living beings. Happiness, unhappiness, birth and death, genetic inheritance and genetic transmission (donation) are typical of living beings, in their freedom and freedom of their species. The perfections and imperfections of all living beings represent the form of their freedom and that of the species. There are no “supreme interests” as Hegel claims, but simple interests.

Dear friend, dear Phyllis, I would now also like to point out the practical consequences deriving from this concept of God as Creator for our artistic activities. Artistic Informalism received new impetus thanks to Hegel’s Lectures on Aesthetics, because Hegel’s writings led to the basis of Kant’s theories, set out in his Critique of Pure Reason and his other two Critiques. Thus after much troubled theological disputes over the centuries, the Idealists claimed to have identified “the supreme interests of the spirit” by giving the physicality the role of “ballast”.

50
But the experiments in neuroscience soon countered the Idealists’ claim.

In my *Letter to Plato*, I mentioned the experiment conducted by the great physiologist Joseph Moruzzi. His experiment clearly shows that the brain, being easy to model and so structure thanks to the physical perceptions of the peripheral nervous system, works as directed by our peripheral physical perceptions. So the purpose of the peripheral nervous system coincides with that of the brain and so the existence of any “ballast” is thus ruled out.

Purposeful thought is the purposeful function of the whole physical body and what we call “Spirit”. This means our body is not “ballast”, but an independent project and purpose for a divine reason. Our body is our Spirit, and we call the reason for its efficiency God. Now the theoretical philosophies of Informalism humiliate our physicality, by seeing the body and its form as inert mud. But the ballast body of the Idealists is nothing other than a negation of the Spirit. The denial of the purpose of the body is the denial of its Reason. It is simply the denial of God, as can seen in their philosophy. Artistic Informalism has dusted off some obvious aspects of outdated Docetic and Gnostic theory after some two thousand years in the shape of its contempt of the material world in favour of an imaginary spiritual purity. But in this brief period, neuroscientists have shown, by revealing the inner workings of rationality, that Spirit is the function of the body. They have demonstrated that the distinction between mind and brain is arbitrary and not true: “the Cartesian description of the mind as a thinking substance has finally been abandoned: the mind is not a substance, but a pro-
It is now clearly obvious that, as there can be no Spirit unless it is the purpose of a physical body, so there can be no Art unless it is the purpose of representing the form of the physical body. The form of Art is the representation of evolved form, that is the physical purpose. Spirit and matter cannot be split, just as God cannot be separated from the world. Where there is physical existence there is the reason for its existence. The representation of form is the representation of the Spirit and thus of God, who is the transcending reason. Where there is no representation of physical form, there will be no representation of its Reason. Since the body without purpose is not body, any denial of the body is an implicit denial of the purpose of the body, which means the negation of the Spirit. There are also clearly heretic Catholics among the modern Gnostics and Docetes, even if they hold important academic chairs. The Catholic Church today has a duty to artistic doctrinal clarity. The Informalism of believing Jews and Muslims - even if they forbid the representative of God, figuratively and informally, in order to extend this prohibition to the human figure - is desperately clinging to the cliché which says: “God created the world in His likeness, now the form of Art degrades it in being an inadequate copy and so offends God”. Modern Christian Docetes - though perhaps without being aware of contradiction with Catholic belief - can be considered proper heretics. In any case, even assuming that Nature is a divine creation, the figurative nature of Art is not in competition with the divine creation, as the art form is related only by analogy to the form of divine creation.
Even the human attributes given to God by analogy are so inadequate for God and hide Him, but considering our limits they cannot offend Him. However it is argued here that God could not have created the forms of the world that, for the above reasons, are coeternal with God. These forms are the purpose of matter and the intimate nature of evolution. However, artistic representation of the form provides the greatest example of purposeful power, while Informalism defeats itself by insisting on the death of every purpose and thus in the death of God, whether Creator or not.

Dear Phyllis, I still have the impression that I have not got across exactly what I think and so I want to pick up some arguments again with the hope of clarifying things.

The beginning of Form is the same beginning of Energy, since we cannot imagine that Form is free of Energy nor can we image Energy free of Form. Now if the start of a physical form must exist, there must also be a physical entity prior to that beginning and this cannot be a non-physical entity because the generated form cannot be different in nature from the parent or the creature from the Creator. It has been said that God created man in His own image and likeness. Now, since God could not have the image and likeness of a physical body, these are not created. Neither can the energy of the bodies be created, because, as mentioned above, these are simultaneous with their energy.

So if Energy was not created, it must be that it always existed in a form. Birth and death are not the beginning and end of the life form, thus - in one way and then another - Form continues to be a form of life. Even during our
own lives, we are not the same from birth, but our form changes constantly. We know that all the cells of our body die and are replaced many times over while we live and so transmit their project to the new cells that replace them. So birth and death are the intimate nature of the form of individuals making up the world.

It is evident that each individual is the limit of the other. This limit is the origin of individual purposes that are the starting conditions for a common purpose. For this reason, even before individuals come together in their common interest, it is necessary that there is antagonism to the benefit of themselves and to the detriment of others, which results in the simultaneous presence of Good and Evil. Hence we cannot deny the existence of a purpose in evolution and therefore a purpose that transcends it. But this does not mean we must recognise the "intelligent plan" of a Creator.

The intelligent Design according to Creationists presupposes a preordained scheme, compared to everyday life, but the life of every individual has an individual scheme that is a matter of chance, but developed with determination in accordance with his or her affirmation and the chances offered by coincidence. "It is necessary to distinguish coincidence from pure chance." Every movement of Nature is logical and has purpose, although it is free and orderly owing to the reason that transcends the scheme. We call this reason for freedom and purpose "God". The reason for evolution, or transformation, surpasses all transformation and so Good and Evil cannot be separated because each transformation requires both as the condition for that transformation. So there are no in-
dividuals actually segregated and independent, but inter-
dependent parts of the world each individually motivated
by a specific function necessary for their existence. God
thus appears to us as the inscrutable reason for sponta-
neous evolution of the parts (or individuals) of the world,
all with a harmonious purpose to ensure the existence of
the world.

Individuals as parts cannot acknowledge the existence
of the pure infinite, this is to say, not made up by their
presence as parts. If the various parts did not make up
the world, there would be no parts of the world and so in-
dividuals would lack their self-understanding, namely
their role in the world, dear Phyllis.

One day I witnessed a fact in a wood that made me un-
derstand a great truth: a sparrow chick screeched his hun-
ger and thirst for freedom, while the equally hungry and
thirsty other chicks just huddled together in the same nest.
That sparrow used all its energy to quit the nest in his
quest for a goal that was disproportionate to its capacity
and so it fell and died. This is what we do when we attempt
to overcome the “finite” as part of the infinite in order to
understand the pure infinite. We fail to take into account
our actual abilities and so cannot answer the question whe-
ther or not the “finite” is a part of the “infinite” and, then,
the sum of the parts may not be a finite sum (that is if all
the parts form a “bad infinity”, as Hegel said).

We must take refuge in the nest not as a result of giving
up our quest for freedom, but for fear of falling into the
pride that is the death of Reason. Great courage is “not
being afraid of being afraid”. We must be faithful to Rea-
son: God himself is the reason for all the nests. Good and
Evil must appear as understandable parts of an incomprehensible whole.

We should realise that both Good and Evil are not pure and autonomous entities, but of varying degrees and reciprocal. Thus nothing is totally good or evil in itself, but changes by degrees depending on the use made of it. So it is not possible that God is the Creator of Good and Evil, because He would now be good and now evil, now just and now unfair, depending on how we use these values. So God cannot be attributed anything that leads to the start of Good or Evil, to the strength of a religion or its destruction, to the formation of the universe or its destruction.

As a result God, the Reason of the world, and the world must be coeternal and there must be an unbridgeable chasm of Nature between the world and His Reason. God is the infinite incomprehensible reason of incomprehensible infinite existence. So Good and Evil will appear as the condition of living beings without giving them any credit for the good they do and blaming them for the evil they do. And if someone asks what moral laws are for, the answer is that these indicate that to do good is a sign of perfection and to do evil is a sign of imperfection, but only in relation to the needs of the life of men acting together. In fact, a segregated man living alone can do neither good nor evil. And the laws based on history are simply the measure of Good and Evil in the human society.

However, if a man helps spread the plague microbe, he would be considered a good man by those microbes, illuminated by God (perhaps under false pretences) and so touched by perfection. But the man who helps the spread of plague would be considered wicked by men, touched by
imperfection and poisoned by Evil. Now, if God were the Creator, He would also be the creator of the plague microbe and we cannot say whether God is good or evil when He favours the spread of plague that does not spare the good and the innocent. Since God cannot be either good or evil, it must follow that He did not create either Good or Evil and so is not the Creator.

It also follows that everything a man does - if the result of his purpose in life - is a real existential need. Likewise, if Art has no purpose, it cannot have a real need to exist. Without purpose everything disappears and God does not exist.

THE RELIGIOUS CONSEQUENCES

The question of whether God may be man is flawed and is asked when we have already decided that the world has been created by God and is inert matter brought to life by the Holy Spirit. This dualism is due to elements of appearance. In fact, if it is true that the body is corruptible and will die, it is necessary that there is something that will not die otherwise the body would have no purpose. The body would be purely mechanical. It would not explain history or the purposeful tensions that one body sends to another.

If, on the other hand, a body is an indestructible part of the world and its corruption and death are only a transformation, then philosophical Dualism is defeated and in its place remains simple infinite existence.
So if the spirit or purpose of a body is a part of the spirit or purpose of the world, all individual bodies and purposes take the form of the spirit of the world. The diversity of body forms - and thus the diversity of the spirit of living beings - is not an obstacle to the unity of the spirit of the world, just as different numbers in a sum are not an obstacle for the sum. We must, therefore, stress once again that all of the spiritual physical world cannot be the pure infinite of the Idealists. I believe we must stay in the nest.

Dualism is only overcome by stating that the pure infinite is incomprehensible and that the infinite is the totality of finite physical things, in other words the whole world and its purpose. The infinity of the spirit can only be the infinity of the body. But the world and its transformations must not be rendered divine for this reason, as Pantheism would argue. Although the body of the world knows no beginning or end (whether or not it depends on a cause, and no cause conditions it), the reason for its existence cannot be itself, as its purpose would be lost. Indeed a self-sufficient individual has no need to move for a purpose. Thus we find God in the purposeful reasons existing in the world, but precisely for this God is not the world.

God, while not being the infinite “other”, is infinite in terms of the world, which is his reason. God is not something that is as “other” with respect to the world, above it or ruling it. Nor can He be identified in the world since he justifies the purposes existing in the world.

Hence also when it comes to the question of whether Jesus is God, we might say that this is so if one accepts the existence of God as infinite reason for the infinite world.
Jesus made suffering a form of happiness. For this theory to have a real value, He Himself suffered on the Cross and died. In the extreme suffering of His death, He became the last because He was the first. If so, Jesus possessed the reason for the purposes of all living beings despite having a body like all living beings, and He possessed the reason for the purposes of all these, overcoming the individual purposes to which we are all subject. Jesus was beyond any contingency, and so beyond Good and Evil. This cannot be so for anyone who only recognises God on the basis of doctrine. Jesus was the reason for all existence. And given that only God is recognised as the reason for all existence, Jesus must be God.

This is, however, only true if Jesus is not one of God’s creations, that is if God is not the Creator.

It is said that Jesus was generated and not created to make possible his divinity and his corporeality. But if Adam was created it was with his seed and the project of his seed. And given that all the next generation after Adam was already in his seed, the whole physical generation descends from the seed of Adam. So if God created Adam, He also created Jesus and so Jesus cannot be God, otherwise God would have created himself, which is impossible.

If, on the other hand, Adam was non created (i.e. God is not the Creator), then the whole generation is uncreated including Jesus and then Jesus could be God through having been recognised as the reason for all existence.

Jesus generated and not created would be a real man even if the true God. And the body of Jesus is not an appearance, as the Gnostics and Docetes say: His body is
part of the uncreated infinite. The body of Jesus has thus always existed, as we have always existed all of us. Jesus did not die because none of us dies. Jesus is still alive and it is thus pointless to resort to the concept of resurrection.

Dear Phyllis, we call Art the personal representation of evolutionary form with purpose that only, if it ever existed, leads us to the knowledge of the existence of God. But, on the contrary, if God is the Creator, then Art could, albeit wrongly, be considered an offence to God. Since nothing can be done by us that is not inferior to divine Creation, we must admit that Art is useless even if it does not offend God.

But the not mistaken consequence, if God is the Creator, is that which condemns any attempt to improve Creation by distancing physical suffering from us. If God is the Creator of all action taken by creatures to fight physical disease, then this is a sin of pride in the face of God’s Creation. Thus even treatment of physical disease would be a insult to God if God is the Creator. Indeed, God might have created physical diseases as a right of life for whatever it is that causes death in us. Therefore, it seems obvious to me that God is not the Creator.

I hope, dear friend, that you will tell me what you think and will set out any reasons you may have to convince me otherwise.

MARIO DONIZETTI
“LETTERA A PHYLLIS”

Pubblicato in italiano
2007

Copyright Mario Donizetti
Note 1

LETTER TO PLATO
(Copyright Mario Donizetti 1997)
Dear Plato, dear Master,

Perhaps nobody has told you yet what the scientists of my day have magnanimously made known to everyone, breaking down the distinction between the man of common sense and the philosopher of “ecstatic knowledge”.

I too have come to know certain facts. I have placed them in relation to recent problems concerning art and to your doctrine of “ideas” and have decided to write you this letter.

Well, the famous neurologist Vittorino Andreoli told me that when an organism is composed of few cells it never possesses a nervous system and even less a central nervous system, or brain, because since there are few cells they are all in direct contact with the exterior of the body to which they belong and therefore can have, autonomously and directly from outside, what they need for survival. And yet without the directives of a brain all the cells act for their own individual good which is simultaneously the good of the whole organism. The cells of an organism are each structured in accordance with its own exigency just like those which without being part of an organism live in coacervation in an autonomous and not communal manner. Cells in coacervation, even if close to one another, have no reciprocal useful relationship and no interchange, unlike those of an organism.
I am asking you here if it is possible to say that an organism is such and differs from the accumulation when the cells take on, with the others nearby and adjacent, a function ordered towards a common purpose and are no longer autarchic and autonomous. If this may be said then it seems to me one may also say that a non-incompatible relationship is possible between “plurality” and “unity”. One may say that what determines “an” organism as such is the common finality of its parts and it is thus possible to think that the parts of an organism are in turn “one” and are so because they are moved in turn by a finality such as the nucleus, the membranes etc. (in the specific case of cells). These parts in turn are constituted of other increasingly numerable parts characterised by a common finality, such as molecules, atoms and smaller particles. As I said, the “plurality” (the parts of an organism) becomes “unity” only when the parts assume a common finality. You have shown that “one” cannot be formal even if spherical and monobloc, as Parmenides said. I recall your observation: that the centre of a sphere is not the surface, so it remains that “one” is only the end which however, precisely because it is the end, transcends the parts. Through its unity it transcends forms and their mechanism. Contrarily, in fact, if the finality of the mechanism were identified in the mechanism itself, as the moderns would have it, even the very idea of mechanism would be lacking. In fact it is the “one” which makes possible the “many” inasmuch as the “many” are “many one”. If the “one” of the finality did not exist we should not be able to have the idea of “one” and therefore neither should we be able to have the idea of the “many” mechanisms and the
many forms, the many cells and the many atoms which are “many” precisely because they are “one” in the finality.

Individuation of the mechanism, that is, the form function of an object or a body is possible where a “finality” is identified, as we said with regard to the organism in comparison with the coacervation. So it is necessary that the “one” be the existence of the “many” and vice versa: the many would not exist had they not “a” finality, and the finality would not exist if the many were not finalised because without the many nothing would be finalised.

The transcendence of the finality renders possible the existence of both the “one” and the formal “many”.

The “many” would be annihilated, that is, non-existent, without the existence of the “one” and yet the “one” in turn would have no “reality” if it lacked the “many” because it would be the finality of that which does not exist, and a finality of that which does not exist does not exist. Thus it is necessary that “one” and “many”, that is, the bodies and their purpose, are simultaneous even though distinct.

So I was saying to you that when an organism becomes complex thanks to the continual multiplication of its cells, when the cells are so numerous as to exceed the surface of the organism exposed to the exterior, which is to say when some cells are isolated from this exterior within the organism and no longer have the possibility of external contact in order to directly satisfy their needs of awareness of their individual good and bad, and hence can no longer directly choose their good and attend to their preservation, the organism manufactures nerve cells and sets
them in a system branching throughout the body that brings into the organism, that is, into the internal cells of the body, the information that the external cells already know due to their position.

In the so-called higher animals the number of cells is such as to arrive at billions of billions, so the nervous system, as may be seen, needs a centre for data gathering and retransmission of commands to all the cells of the body in accordance with information received, again with view to survival of the entire organism.

Just as couriers bring information to the central State office from outlying districts, so the information from the outlying areas of our body is brought to the brain by a chain of nerve cells.

Just as the Government issues orders to frontier regions concerning what to do or not to do with regard to adjoining states in accordance with information received, so the brain issues orders to do or not do this or that, in accordance with information received, to all the cells of the body. And it cannot be excluded that States, since earliest antiquity, have organised themselves without knowing it on the model of genetic organisms with view to the same necessity and therefore in accordance with a natural law. In the functions of receiving and communicating information the whole body feels, takes part in these functions, feels itself in a tension finalised towards its functions precisely as in a true democracy. The State is at the service of the individuals comprising it and the latter identify the State with their own interests. And it cannot be excluded that for both a body and for a State there is a natural collapse when there is no reciprocation of “amo-
rosi sensi”, as you put it. You conceived your Republic precisely as a natural body with specialised subdivision of the parts. Like a body, which uses various cells specialised according to functions. You thought of men specialised in particular functions at the service of the republic.

But to return to our main interest: the cells of an organism without a nervous system and without a brain nonetheless possess, as I told you, the capacity for finalised behaviour: they have their optimal way of behaving in order to live and multiply. Neither more nor less than the cells organised by a central nervous system. Their method appears very simple but is equally perfect.

Thus, as I told you, as the number of cells of an organism gradually increases, the complexity and not the perfection of the nerve network and its central system increases. This complex nerve and brain organisation seems to be formed to solve a problem formerly solved by the same organism when its cells were so few as to be all logistically located in contact with the external world, as I already said. But it is necessary that, over and above appearances, this organisation be finalised for the solution of a problem that is new and posterior to that of nutrition or survival and multiplication of the cells, the solution of an already solved problem being incomprehensible.

Good. These facts call for a correction or more precise stating of your theory of the anteriority of “ideas” with regard to reality.

Your doctrine has it that reality is a “copy” of the “idea”. You’ve already understood me, but all the same I
shall give you information that the science of your day could not give you: our brain too, like that of other animals - and here I humbly beg you to continue reading my letter with goodwill - was formed after the complex developments of the number of cells of our ancestral body which was itself formed like others starting out from our first common ancestral cell. And as with all organisms, our ancestor too had first to form a nervous system and then to centralise it in the encephalon.

This presupposes that our first ancestral cell and our present cells must have possessed and must possess a structure with the function of a central nervous system which though not capable of a long term memory is capable of deciding immediately, that is, without cerebral mediation and rapidly, with regard to its own good, and of refusing the bad.

This decisional ability or teleological freedom of cells and acephalous organisms is interpreted by some as pure mechanism without free finality. But it goes against reason that a mechanism should move without purpose. In fact if an organism had not a finality it would be immobile, it would have no other purpose than to exist without moving for a purpose. The power to be immobile in full self-satisfaction renders any mechanism superfluous because the simple power of self is in itself sufficient for its existence and there is no need of any mechanism for existing in accordance with a mechanism. It is therefore necessary that where there is a mechanism there is also a finalised Exigency which renders the mechanism efficient and finalised by transcending it.

Individual cells, as we have seen, possess teleological
efficiency, they possess *logical efficiency*. So it is necessary that the behaviour of the organism composed of cells without a central nervous system should differ from that with a central nervous system only in not having a centralised and long term memory. The encephalic idea thus appears to us as the memory of the *cellular logical-efficient* capacity, a memory also useful for the preservation of those segregated cells logistically located far from the organism’s external contact, as I told you. We may therefore hypothesise that both organisms composed of cells without a nervous system and organisms organised by a brain have an “idea” of their finality. The former have a *short term memory idea* suitable or useful to current decisions without remembrance or historical memory of decisions taken previously, and in this act-decision they exhaust memory of themselves. The latter have the possibility of preserving this short term memory since it is transmitted by means of the nerve network to an archive teleologically active in favour of those cells without contact with external reality.

As you have seen, this archive feeds information also to those cells that are logistically in contact with the external world, thanks to the nerve network which first brings the short term memory to the brain but then redistributes it, by means of the same instrument, as *long term memory*. The brain is no other than the memory of an organism’s teleological necessities, but in both the acephalous and cephalous organism we see a finalised mechanism equally perfect to the extent that we cannot say which of the two is better.

Now, going back to our first ancestral cell and hence
to the precedence of ideas with regard to reality, I have to think that now you too, having learnt of the origins of our brain and the exigency or purpose for which it was formed, will think that Socrates, in the marvellous dialogue with Hippias, should maintain the contrary of what he did maintain.

Today you would put into the mouth of Socrates that it is no longer thinkable that the idea of bed is anterior to a real bed and is a copy of the “species” bed given by God, since in that case our first ancestral cell, ancestral also to other animals such as fish and worms, would have already had to have the idea of bed.

The first ancestral cells had no brain for thinking historically so they could have neither the idea of “species” nor the idea of bed, which is historical par excellence.

Historical ideas, as you have seen, call for a central nervous system in order to be determined, to be structurally built as long term memory with the pieces of short term memory. So it seems to me that if something must be anterior to physically formal reality, as you would have it with the idea of “species”, in the case of the bed this something is only the exigency of repose which is anterior to the idea of bed because one may rest even without a bed. The cells feel this exigency in relation to their form without a historical or encephalic idea of bed and the species bed.

You see that the constitution of a central nervous system or brain is due to the exigency of preserving the memory of the exigencies gathered by the nerve network.

The constitution of the nervous system is due to the exigency to transmit, to the internal cells of the organism,
the experience of the cells in a position of contact exterior to the organism. The cells’ position of contact with the exterior of the organism is due to their exigency for nutrition or awareness of the world external to the ends of an internal interest, and in turn nutrition is due to the exigency to exist. After which it seems to me that all these needs differentiated by their phenomena are moved by a single Primary and undifferentiated need. It seems to me that the Exigency to exist is the same for all phenomena.

In fact if it is true that the constitution of the central nervous system is the last in time in the formation of an organism, if it is true that once the central nervous system or brain is constituted it is the most important in relation to the finality of preservation of the organism (even if as a result the brain has been able to have other finalities). I believe, and You must tell me if I’m wrong, that the whole organism is posited by the Exigency of its existence. If this is so the temporal succession of what we have listed as needs, which lead to formation of the organism, including its central nervous system, are no other than a list of phenomena due to one Exigency alone. Then the phenomena are in a logical succession because their Exigency is one only. In fact what was numbered as the first exigency in the finality of the preservation of an organism is also the last, which means simultaneous with the first and the intermediaries. Their consecutiveness being only a partiality of the whole, they are reduced in the whole to unity. Since the Exigency is not subject to suffering time and the determined numeration of phenomena, it is necessary that it be “one” and transcend phenomena.

Implicitly, the Primary Exigency, transcending single
phenomena, cannot be a cause of phenomena since between cause and caused there cannot, for requirements of reason, be difference of nature.

And again for rational exigencies it immediately follows that single phenomena cannot cause, only in themselves, other phenomena. In fact phenomena are logically coordinated, and what is subject to coordination cannot be coordinator: what is subject to power does not have power. If phenomena are logically finalised, the logic of phenomena transcends them. And "one" transcendent finality cannot but finalise "one" single phenomenon. So the many phenomena are parts of a single phenomenon. It thus appears clear that also the constitution of organisms with a brain is a part of the same phenomenon that constitutes single-cell, beings, molecules, atoms and the entire mineral world: what I mean is the whole of existence.

Today certain scientific researchers deny that phenomena have a necessary cause and think that the phenomenon is due to its "condition". This concept of "condition" seems no different to me than the concept of cause. It seems to me that "condition" is a multitude of simultaneous causes. Instead of having a previous necessary cause, as the ancients said, the phenomenon would have many and some of them would give the phenomenon at random. This new theory of chance, setting aside the ancient theory, seems to be a distortion of Heisenberg's theory. The great scientist realised that in the subatomic world (and only there because in the great cosmos it is admitted that the law is not random) observation of phenomena interfered as concomitant cause in the carrying out thereof, contaminating them. He realised that the only
way to approach the truth of phenomena was to numerate the experimental results and see in how many observations under given “conditions” the expected phenomenon occurred. This means attributing causal power to “conditions”.

The phenomenon would still depend on the necessary nature of the cause and not be given at random. In fact the case would invalidate the value of the calculation of the probabilities. If the absence of the phenomenon were due to chance, so would the phenomenon be, and no science can be founded on what could be and at once not be. Heisenberg must have deeply believed in the necessary link between cause and effect if he elaborated a method of inquiry on the cause-effect relationship which excluded discontinuity and the researcher’s imprecision of observation.

So I was saying that just as phenomena cannot cause other phenomena, and that these exist for Primary Exigency which transcends them, so this Exigency cannot cause them, otherwise it would not transcend them since between a cause and the caused a relationship of the same nature is necessary.

Some time ago it seemed to me that the mover of phenomena was an efficient cause, but now I realise that the concept of cause is so formed as to be inadequate for what I want to say.

In fact by “cause” we understand that which has the power of an act which is the caused. This relationship presupposes a temporal anteriority of the cause with regard to the caused, whereas now I seem to understand that between the phenomenon and its Exigency there is no tem-
poral relationship (of the earlier with regard to the later), no relationship of giving and taking, but of “being” simultaneously. The Exigency of the world which we have called by the name of God not only cannot be the cause of the world because this would mean attributing to the Cause the nature of the caused, but no more can it be efficiency of the world since it is impossible that an efficient thing like the world is posterior to its efficiency, so the “causes” and phenomena are simultaneous and thus also the modern concept of “condition”, presupposing anteriority of the “condition” over phenomena, is inadequate. In fact according to scientific researchers, without “condition” the phenomenon could not occur, so the “condition” is a multitude of causes, which, as we have seen, is impossible.

It therefore remains that the temporal logical successions of phenomena are due to the fact of being these, consequential parts of one single uncaused phenomenon, and transcended by the Exigency of its unitary existence. It follows that between an anterior phenomenon and another subsequent to it there remains the same logical relationship as between cause and effect, excepting provisional deviations of the course of the envisaged phenomenon due to interference of the freedom of unknown phenomena, phenomena which, once known, restore full logicality to their course as if they were due to necessary causes. Randomness is therefore excluded.

You will now ask me if a determined phenomenon may occur without objective causes, which is to say without “condition”.

At first sight it seems impossible, but I have observed
this: a group of young plant shoots growing from seed in a homogeneous manner in the shade of a little wall. Some time later I saw that some of their extremities tended towards a crack in the wall which afforded light and air. After a few days I noted that the shoots bent towards the light had grown considerably in comparison with the others and were decisively headed towards the top of the wall. It was clear that these shoots were behaving, from a finalistic viewpoint, in a different manner from the others and in this, with regard to their growth, in an optimal manner. The others remained smaller. I ask you this question: was the crack the anterior cause of the greater growth of these shoots, or was it their personal exigency to grow more?

It seems to me that the one and the other are simultaneous. It seems to me that if the crack is a cause then the seed, the earth and the heat are cause, and the shoot itself is cause of its own greater growth. If this is so, the shoot is cause of itself, which is impossible as we have seen. So the Primary Exigency of the shoots is the same that moves the environment and the shoots and appears simultaneous with their existence, and the phenomena in logical succession appear to us as rational parts of a single reality. The “parts” are consequently logical because they constitute reality and not because they are caused as phenomena, which would be to admit their total lack of freedom.

However it is still necessary to resolve an apparent contradiction: if the reality is one, are its parts, which is to say the rationalised phenomena, obliged to be just as they are and is there no freedom? Is what I called a personal pro-
ject-related idea an illusion? The response is that personal intervention in the world of things is free but in accordance with the law formed by the freedom of things previously possessed in the formation of the world. I am not free to not think since in not wanting to think I think about not wanting to think. Thus I am free to add to the evolutionary phenomenon of the world that which the world lacks for its evolution in accordance with my personal opinion and, as my opinion is given by logical Exigency, it is necessary to the logic of the world. Freedom is guaranteed by logicality and not by caprice, which is to say by chance. The latter does not even guarantee itself. Since if chance is given at random it could be not given. What is given is guaranteed by its necessity. Thus the project, though personal and free, is universal and governed by law.

I repeat myself: the addenda of a sum are set out freely with different values and are therefore free, but the sum is unique and the law determining it is one only. The idea of reality prior to personal encephalic consciousness is bound to the freedom of previous ancestors or individuals and constitutes law. The project-related idea of present individuals is free and will constitute law when it is codified. The brain is free in the active but not retroactive project. In fact modern researchers have observed, as You will see below, the existence in the encephalon of two distinct zones, one genetic which has taken on atavistic experiences as law, and another called the “plastic zone” which represents free personal experiences and therefore renders possible a personal project free from genetic law, and thus the world constitutes itself through its own freedom which becomes law.
Dear Plato, I’ll come back now to Your problem of the anteriority of “ideas” over reality.

After having seen that the rational or encephalic idea of reality is posterior to any given reality, in the light of recent discoveries it seems to me necessary to understand better, I should say in a detailed way, how one can have, over and above the encephalic idea of any object whatsoever such as a specific bed, also an idea of its “species”.

First of all I have seen that the only Exigency is that of existence and that the logical and objective succession of phenomena is finalised towards the constitution of the totality.

Then I see not only that the totality cannot have a finality beyond itself, but not even an immanent finality. It seems to me necessary that the sum or totality of phenomena has no finality at all, because the totality is the finishing line of the finality of its parts.

It seems to me that a finality cannot be immanent: an athlete runs to win the race. Victory goes beyond running and transcends it, but if the finishing line did not exist the athlete would run to run. The finality would be immanent, that is, inexistent. Finality by its nature calls for its extinction by means of the carrying out of its acts towards a destination.

The immanence of the finality of the world seems to me a conjuring trick devised to save the infinity of the world and at the same time, contradictorily, the concept of cause, which is to say its beginning from nothingness.

In fact if the world is infinite it seems not to possess a finishing line, and without a finishing line the finality disappears and thus the cause disappears. In order not to
make it disappear it is declared that the finality is immanent to the world.

But I believe that finality is only in the things that form the world and the finality of things, like the things themselves, dies out in the creation of the world.

Some may point out that the totality of the world is given by its parts: if the parts possess finality, this is also possessed by the totality. One may reply to this observation by pointing out the example of the bodies of the earth which have a determined weight on the earth, but the earth constituted by the totality of the weighing bodies has no determined weight. To assume a finality as a sum of the parts, even though within the world, means admitting for this finality a process of return to phenomena and so there would be two finalities, one towards the totality and the other a return to phenomena. If this were so it would also be possible to repeat formally identical bodies, the form of the bodies being the phenomenal form of the finality.

So it is necessary that the bodies of the world be different and in eternal change, precisely due to their personal finality. Even with a purpose to achieve they constitute the immobility of the world. And how it is possible to have movement of the parts and immobility of all of them in their totality is once more suggested by the nature of the addenda, which are many, different and mobile and their sum necessarily immobile.

The world cannot have finality since this would be re-proposing (on the world’s part) that which its parts proposed in order to constitute it. It seems to me that the finality of things is the creation of their identity, which is to say their specific difference from others. If things did
not have this finality, and therefore no reciprocal difference, the world in its nature would not exist. Thus the finality transcends things in constituting the world. If the world were to include the finality of things it would destroy itself. Finality is *in* the world but not *of* the world. So there is a clear necessity for logical coordination, meaning finalised towards the constitution of the world, of the individual parts of the world which it transcends without being their cause.

Dear Master, I believe I can see that *modes* of existing are given by one single Exigency and I believe it is true that *modes* of existing depend on the freedom of existing things.

In fact without freedom, infinite modes of being are not possible. After all, there is no sense in imposing one form of existence rather than another for the Exigency of existence. Before any form of existence exists it is impossible to prefer one to another, so freedom is innate to existence and any predetermination of the world is senseless. We may therefore think that existence had and has the freedom to give itself form by itself, but not as a choice which would presuppose the existence of several forms to choose from. Giving itself form by itself should be understood as inventing its own form by itself. Only in this way is there freedom, because the freedom to choose between this or that form is an obligatory choice of either this or that. Original and absolute freedom is not choosing but creating the form, and this naturally involves the contemporaneity of existence and of God, intuited as Exigency of existence as I have already said. Thus the first cell, our ancestor, took its form for itself. There being no constrict-
tions, what it decided was perfect for its purpose. It decided by itself its form of life, just as its constituent parts of molecules, atoms and tinier particles had done.

Evolution of the *mode* of existing led the first cells to establish themselves as organisms and, subsequently, some of them to form a central nervous system and a related manner of existence.

It is thus necessary that what You call *idea of species* of a bed is the idea of genetic rest associated with a multitude of ideas referring to all beds experienced, which is to say the instruments of rest descended from one single Exigency.

Further, I seem to understand that the "idea" of bed which You imagined not only does not have a *formal relationship* with a determined bed but not even with objects which by analogy have the same finality of genetic rest.

Billions of years ago there was no cutlery for eating at table, because it was not necessary and not required by exigency. So today this cutlery cannot have a relationship of resemblance or formal imitation with an idea of its "species" which, descending from God, as You would have it, should always have existed in the cells and atoms of our molecule ancestors.

It thus happens that the part of the (human) brain that deals with the memory of the necessities or exigencies of genetic rest immediately interacts with the part of the brain known as plastic, which deals with the current processing of the whole organism’s finalistic behaviour, and associates the form of a bed with the possibility of satisfying a need for rest, even if that person has never had
the idea of bed. It seems to me that in the possible use of an object, by necessity one creates for this object the idea that You call “species”, so any object such as a bed is other than its finalised function which it transcends (certainty that objects remain transcended by their finality is achieved when one sees formally and functionally different objects with an identical finality, like a watch and an hourglass). In reality the bed is formally unique. It is independent of any other form of bed and therefore independent of an idea of “species”. And here once more I believe one can understand how it is possible to have the relationship of the plurality of determined objects with the unity of the so-called idea of species. One understands once more the means by which it is possible to have a relationship between the “one” and the “many”, as I told You.

So it seems to me impossible that a carpenter builds beds by making a copy of the “idea of species” of bed, because between the “one” of the finality and the “many” beds built by the carpenter, as I have seen, a formal relationship is not possible. In the same way, nor is it possible for a painter to make a copy of one of the carpenter’s beds in a painting. Each idea and each representation of the idea appears to us unique, and dependence on an anterior model inexistent.

I should say then to take it for granted that the idea of “species” of objects is inexistent and must give way to the idea of form of finality, as said earlier, and I should say that the artist paints an object like a bed which does not formally “resemble” the “bed” built by the carpenter but represents it objectively through the analogy of its finalised
function, recognisable by the genetic exigencies common to both the artist and the beholder of the work of art. A “copy” is therefore impossible. Impossible both in the idea and in the concrete, physically perceptible form. What unites different forms in so-called resemblance (every form is absolutely unique) is their common finality and the usability thereof on our part. The unifying formal element is the synthesis of the formalised elements finalised by us, meaning by our project. This of course involves exclusion from our interest of forms of the real object not finalised by us, and we have always called these “accidental” although, in the object, they occupy the same role as those we call “substantial”. The forms useful to our project we call “substance”. Those excluded we call “accidents” but it is clear that both the “substance” and “accidents” of an object are really the same. And so it may also happen that what have formerly been considered “accidents” become “substance” in accordance with our new project-related interest.

Dear Master, I confess that I made a great effort to seek the origin of the idea of “species” and its “substantial” form. This is why you must tell me if it has been wasted effort.

And now I’ll tell you about the results of an experiment carried out by Moruzzi: “Overturning visual perception by placing in front of one eye, from birth, a permanent lens which turns images round by a hundred and eighty degrees, one obtains a structuring of the occipital cortex involved, which is inverted with regard to the contralateral” (Vittorino Andreoli, La norma e la scelta, Mondadori 1984, p. 25).
You understand that something falling on an eye with that lens rises to the other eye, and this means that if the idea of “species” of object were anterior to seeing the object, the lens could not modify the structure of the cerebral cortex dealing with perception of the object, and the overturned view of the objects would be only a passing optical disturbance. As You can see, even ideas, which are the basis and the constituent elements of the form of reality, such as verticality, horizontality and gravitation, are posterior to the perceiving to the vertical and horizontal lines etc. of objects. These ideas, as You have seen, are formed structurally, and therefore objectively, in the encephalon on the sensorial dictates of the “plastic zone”, that zone which deals with consciousness of new problems and therefore with their solution by means of project-related freedom. It follows that the logical structure of thought is established by the physical structure of the cerebral cortex, and this from the sensorial perceiving of reality. I see that the logic of thought is dictated by the logic of nature external to the encephalon, or at least, reasoning, I may theorise that encephalic rationality is harmoniously simultaneous with the logic of nature. By this I mean that thought is objective and the senses possess logical and finalistic functionalities like the brain.

But for about two hundred years philosophers have been in love with an apparent idea: they have believed that the “idea” of reality and reality were not objective. Whereas You, more than two thousand years ago, had strongly postulated the contrary. Later I’ll tell You about the crime. But following the latest scientific discoveries we
may say that the “subjective” is reduced to only the “individual”. The individual is distinguished from the subjective by its possibility of personally utilising the objective ideas of its plastic encephalon.

The subjectivism of the old modern world, on the other hand, repudiates the objectivity of the idea of reality and poses this dilemma: either the world is posited by the subject (subjectively posited) or the individual is predetermined and without freedom.

But it seems to me that objective ideas do not impede freedom of the individual who, intervening in the evolution of the world, affirms the objectivity of the world and personal freedom. The latest discoveries reaffirm both freedom and the objectivity of ideas. They deny that the conditions of consciousness are immutable or *a priori*. They deny that these conditions are common to all individuals.

It seems to me that my project is new with regard to what the senses brought to my brain. My finalistic intervention on reality, free because finalistic, is objective because it has the strength to modify the previous objective reality.

I should tell You that I am a painter and, as I told You, this is why in the final analysis I am writing to You.

I should like to tell You that observing the processes that allow me to paint a picture I see that first of all there is the desire to paint. This, I should say, is traceable to that Exigency and logic-efficient capacity I told You about. Then I see that the idea of reality, or the encephalic memory I have of reality, permits me to imagine by means of my freedom the form of the work I am planning, in ac-
cordance with an aim of mine that takes form in accordance with my personal form or structure.

The picture I am going to paint will, I believe, make use of ideas or memory of objects of reality as constituent material, such as the bricks of a house, and of an impulse or Exigency to put forward a new reality, like a new house responding to a new function that is not identified in the objects of reality which I use, such as bricks, and of which I have an objective idea, but will transcend them by means of my purpose in creating the painting, like a house. But in the making, the new painting does not respect the project-related idea, even though it does not overturn it. No preceding idea of a painting has ever guaranteed the painting I later produced. In the making, the new painting becomes really new, and when it is complete and placed by me into reality, I see that the idea preceding it in a project-related manner has not been realised. In the new formal reality it is seen that from the idea or memory of reality to the project-related idea, and from this to the idea of the new work, there are three steps. So the idea I have of the new picture when it is done is the third idea, setting out from the memory of reality anterior to my personal project, and I can only have this when the picture is finished, and not before beginning it, because before beginning it, it is project only, afterwards subject to unpredictable modifications during execution due to intrusion of the liberties of the external world formally different from my project. Thus the “objective” apprehended by me permits me its objective evolution through my project, even if it does not permit me my whole project.
Some so-called modern theoreticians think that the work of art, precisely because it proceeds from an exigency without guarantee of the result, is not produced by the artist’s logical rigour but by irrationality understood as freedom from the rigour of finalised coherency. As a-logicality, as one Benedetto Croce said. I should say that it is meanwhile necessary to distinguish what is without logical rigour from what is not rational: as You have seen, even organisms without an encephalon, therefore without rationality, behave with a logical rigour which is perhaps superior to that of organisms possessing an encephalon.

So I should say that the capacity of satisfying the exigencies of an organism, the capacity of a suitable and productive personal response to the conditions external to the organism, derive from a highly and rigorously logical capacity which, aside from encephalic memorisation, replaces it in its essential function. This capacity for logical behaviour is also possessed, as I told You, by acephalous and therefore non-rational organisms, so rationality and logicality are distinct entities, yet this logical rigour anterior to encephalic rationality is what qualifies encephalic rationality as logic inasmuch as the latter is posterior to the former and the former constitutes it fundamentally. And it is clear that there cannot be rationality without logical rigour.

This logical rigour or finalised coherency produces life. In fact where there is no logical rigour there is less possibility of survival.

Thus only the work of an acephalous organism may be irrational yet still logical, as we have seen.

Having distinguished rationality from logicality it is
useful to remember, as we have said, that encephalic rationality is the project-related memory of the peripheral logic-efficient capacities of the organism. And so the form of art is the opposite of what is imagined by the so-called moderns: first of all highly logical in order to be a property of nature at all levels including the subatomic; secondly it is rational because it is constituted by the encephalic memory of peripheral cellular logic. So only where cellular logical rigour is absent will there be no encephalic rationality and therefore no emotive cerebral response either in the artist or in the beholder of his work.

A scientific experiment which confirms the dependence of all cerebral emotiveness on cellular logic was carried out on a macaque by a group of scientists. The reactions of the encephalic system were electrically recorded to quantify the monkey’s neuronal response to a drawing (the monkey’s neurons are “homologous” to those of man). The animal was shown a frontal view of a human face. It was then shown the same drawing but without the eyes. Subsequently the drawing was shown with what we should call in today’s artistic jargon naïf lines. Then the image was decomposed and shown in separate parts: “abstract” we should say in artistic jargon today, meaning non-representational: without analogy with the genetic forms of the first drawing. Well, the neuronal responses, beginning with the most intense to the first image, gradually diminished until they almost disappeared with the abstract. (Jean Pierre Changeux, *Ragione e piacere* p. 25, Cortina Ed. 1995). As I have already told You, Moruzzi demonstrated that cerebral structure is dictated by the structure of the images of nature supplied by the sen-
ses. This other experiment demonstrates that the sensitivity of the encephalon is subject to emotive reaction only when the images received therein are logical. *With this it is experimentally ascertained that so-called abstract art produces no emotiveness because it does not possess logic of image. It is ascertained that the brain recognises only the logical figure.* The concept of form, then, is such because its structure is efficient logic: I mean that reality is as the senses perceive it and only consequently as the encephalon thinks of it. This is why there is no encephalic activity beyond logical form.

This logic of the senses is visible in the whole of nature, starting, as You have seen, with the unicellular organisms. The logic of cells, and by necessity of molecules and atoms too, led to the constitution of our central nervous system, as I already told you, which turns out to be the final structure delegated to coordination of the logical exigencies of the various parts of the organism. Coordination which in its function we call rationality, and which is less if less logical forms come into sensorial perception. These, preserved in the encephalic memory, make rationality possible even at a time distance from the logical-sensorial perception. This rationality at a time distance may seem, but only seem, an entity independent of the logical sensorial perception transmitted by the nerve cells to the brain.

And now I shall tell You why I have written this long preamble to the heart of the matter: today there are so-called artists who have abandoned the logical form of nature and who invoke You as a predecessor because they imagine that You condemned art because it is figurative, meaning to say, because it is logical.
In reality these so-called artists are the children of a certain Professor Hegel who, in turn, grew out of the basic principles of Emanuel Kant, the philosopher generally held to be - I'll tell you why later - the father of all modern philosophy. As I was telling You, this Professor Hegel, who plagiarised You by using your arguments set forth in the “Laws” and “Ippia”?? dialogues, and was a teacher of aesthetics among many other things, said that art had a duty greater than its powers and would die from the effort of competing with philosophy. All in all, since Professor Hegel believed himself to be a philosopher, he said that philosophy was more suitable than art for bringing the “supreme interests of the spirit” to consciousness. At the most, art could survive by abandoning its form. As You can see, it is the logical form of nature that is being disputed, and today other eminent professors are convinced that the logic of the form of nature is not the same as encephalic reason; indeed they maintain, as Hegel did, that the “flesh” is so low that is has to be rescued by the “spirit”, intending by “flesh” the logic of nature and by “spirit” any oddity at the limit of madness produced by some dysfunction or encephalic lesion.

The false master copied this great idea of the “spirit” that conquers the “flesh” and served it up to his pupils as his own. They in turn, believing they were doing a good deed, proclaimed that art must either die, as the master had wished, or survive without being a “copy” of reality, which is to say by freeing itself from its so lowly placed “flesh”. This new pure-spirit art was called “abstract” and is created, as You will have understood, without the logical form of reality.
The artist arrives at the opening of his exhibition and says “art is”, but nobody sees anything because if the artist were to show something, the spiritual purity of his art would be polluted. Some time ago “artists” exhibited blank canvases or their own excrement, identifying these things in the artistic subject, but they were simpletons and have now been superseded by the latest spiritually superpure brainwaves. Now, to console the visitors at the opening of their exhibitions, and to leave a tangible sign that art is there but cannot be seen with the eyes of the “flesh” since it is pure spirit, artists cut up bits of plastic or cloth or paper, or condoms, or sanitary towels stained with menstrual blood, and distribute them to those present who go happily off to the restaurant, convinced that at last art has freed itself from its “accidents”.

As I told you, it was Immanuel Kant who laid the groundwork. This Kant said that ideas of reality are formed within us not because the images of reality model our brain, as Moruzzi demonstrated, but because our brain models reality by a capacity or pre-constitution of its structure given *a priori*. Kant implicitly admits that the “categories” of “pure intellect” are in the brain. You must keep in mind that in Kant’s opinion our brain is like a mould, like one of those used in baking in order to give pleasing shapes to cakes and biscuits: fine, the *a priori* conditions are these moulds which we are said to possess in the place of that plastic part of the brain which models itself in accordance with sensorial experiences and which, as I described to You, is structured setting out from a condition that is amorphous or in energetic power with a structure. In Kant’s opinion - but Kant could not think
what we, thanks to scientific discoveries, can think today - the form of nature was like baking dough, as I told You, which takes form only if poured into the mould. So in this philosopher’s opinion the idea of reality is conditioned by the mould possessed \textit{a priori}, and we ourselves fabricate reality which does not exist outside of ourselves or in any case not in the form that we see.

He was in such good faith that he wrote: “Nothing worse could happen to these efforts (of mine) than someone making the unexpected discovery that nowhere is there or can there be \textit{a priori} knowledge” (Kant, \textit{Critica della Ragion Pratica}, Laterza 1983, p. 13). But someone made the unexpected discovery: it was the \textit{evolution} of the species which, refuting all immobile knowledge, consequently refutes any immobile or \textit{a priori} condition of knowledge.

\textit{Evolution} is open to every transformation of the individual and of the species and the \textit{categories do not appear to us as conditions of knowledge but conditioned by knowledge, as Moruzzi demonstrated.}

Well backed up by Kant, Hegel then stated that the “spirit” - that certain something struggling against the “flesh” - would win the artistic struggle only by doing without the logical form of nature. “One may hope that art increasingly rises up and perfects itself, but its form has ceased to be the supreme need of the spirit” (Hegel, \textit{Estetica}, Einaudi 1976, p. 120).

As You can see, these so-called modern artists, repudiated by scientific experience, are desperately seeking points of support for their theory of art without form. It still seems to them that as You said that the form of art is
the “copy” of reality and the form of reality is the “copy” of the idea of species, which is to say copy of the idea given by God, or unique true reality, they must consider figurative art as false. In order to be “true” it should not be a copy of the copy of “truth”, meaning a copy of the copy of the idea “of species”. They feel that they are related to You in some way because you said that art is not truthful. I should like to ask you to clarify to these willing people your true position with regard to the value of the concept of “copy” and of truth. But given that, in the end, these so-called artists and their exegetes have got it in for me because I don’t put my faeces in a box and therefore don’t give “insight into the spiritual”, I should like to permit myself to set down for them Your theory of the “copy” and of the “truth” of art, naturally with your marvellous text to hand. And with your consent I should put it like this: Plato could not give the copy the negative value false, which means the opposite of truth, but only the value of “remote from the truth” (Plato, Politeia X, p. 476, Rizzoli 1953).

This is an interpretation which I believe will not be opposed, because if it had said that art is the contrary of truth, which is to say false, for the sole reason of being a copy of reality, then it would have said that reality too is false since it is a copy of the idea of “species”.

Not only, but Plato also says that ideas of “species” come from God who is the author thereof. So: if from ideas of “species” we have, due to their descent, a false reality, it would mean that ideas of “species” too are false since they too are subject to origin (from God). Since the false cannot be a descendant of the truth nor the truth of
the false, if ideas of "species" which come from God are false, then God too is false.

But Plato did not say this, therefore the Platonic "copy" is the partial representation of Divine truth. Everyone can accept that the first idea is *remote* from the second and the second from the third without claiming as a consequence that the second and third are false. So figurative art is the art of truth, though not identified in Divine truth. Something which, after all, no one has ever claimed.

But reading, hand on heart, Plato’s marvellous dialogues one well understands what Plato was fighting his strategic battle against.

Plato distinguishes "technical or scientific capability" (Plato, *Lo Ione*, p. 90, Rizzoli 1953) or "the capability to act towards a purpose", from the purpose, which is to say from the theme of art. "*This capability of acting towards a purpose when it produces only damage, does this seem to you a good thing?*" (Plato, *Ippia maggiore*, p. 556, Rizzoli 1953).

"Mimesis of something inferior therefore accompanies and generates inferior products" (Plato, *Politeia* X, p. 476, Rizzoli 1953). One sees clearly that "mimesis" as such is not in itself inferior. In fact if the theme of art spoke the truth it would be a good thing. "*We are aware of being subject to the whole charm of poetry*" (Plato, *Politeia* X, p. 482, Rizzoli 1953) and since poetry is the first of the accused, followed by painting, we understand that acquittal is given to both with the words "*The profit will not be small if poetry becomes not only sweet and soothing but also useful*" (Plato, *Politeia* X, p. 438, Rizzoli 1953).
And then you have forgotten or do not know that “poets are of a divine race, the divine breath is in them; with the aid of the Graces and the Muses they draw truth from many things” (Plato, Leggi, p. 341, Rizzoli 1953), so they do not say the opposite of the truth.

And that mimesis as such is not guilty may be read in the second book of the “Laws”. If it is given us to know that the copy, due to artistic merit, has all its own parts and colours and the right figure overall? Does it not follow that he who knows this will also know whether the work is beautiful or in what way it is deficient in beauty?”

“In fact the criterion of justness in mimesis, as we are saying, is precisely this: if the imitated thing is perfectly identical to the original”. Plato wants mimesis to be perfect, otherwise it is condemned as being not true. Since Plato said that the idea is the first model of form from which copies descend, the copies will be formal in accordance with their model, and your theory of ideas without form is overturned, I should say.

Dear Plato, I wanted to end this letter but a half-idea came to me: after having pointed out that there are two rational or encephalic ideas - one which represents the reality communicated by the senses and the other which projects future realities - I realised, but I already told You, that the cells of our ancestors and present day cells had and have a finalistic operative nature like those of the encephalon.

This operative nature of the cells we called logic-efficient capacity, that is, equipped with adaptive capacity useful for survival and equipped with the capacity to transmit information to the encephalon in a project-related
manner. I now realise that these capacities too are carried out in two consequentially logical moments: the first renders the cell *aware* of the reality anterior thereto, and the second renders it *efficient* in the project-related transmission to the encephalon of the reality apprehended, and at the same time awaits a provision or command from the brain to be4 carried out usefully, which is to say in a project-related manner, in favour of itself and of the entire organism.

So I see that also every single cell has, like the rational encephalon, two “ideas” characterised by two different functions. This is why I would now expect You to say that the logic-efficient action of the cells is due to two “ideas”, even if they are not preserved in an encephalic memory. Not only: since these ideas are constituent of rational encephalic ideas and have in common with the latter the Exigency of their existence, I would expect You to say that logic-efficient capacities, or ideas of every single cell, being anterior to rational encephalic ideas, are less remote from the truth and nearer to God than rational encephalic ideas which, following Your ancient doctrine, ought to be a copy of cellular ones. I also think You would add that rational or encephalic ideas, being formed by information received from the cells, are not cakes shaped by a pre-constituted encephalic mould or given *a priori*, as Kant says, who is followed by the so-called modern world.

You would also specify that encephalic-rational ideas formed by cellular logic-efficient ideas, these too in accordance with project-related finality, modify reality with their project so that the reality renewed by the project, being re-perceived by the logic-efficient cells and retran-
smitted to the encephalon, participates in the formation of a successive encephalic project and is thus re-perceived in a circular manner by the cells and retransmitted to the encephalon. Thus the logic-efficient ideas of the cells and encephalic ideas participate together in the evolution of the previous formal reality.

You would clarify that it is impossible to separate the cellular idea from the encephalic and the latter from the form of existence, as Moruzzi demonstrates, and that ideas of reality are not “copies” of reality but reality itself.

Dear Plato, let these truth-lovers know that informel art claims the existence of a knowledge independent of its source. It claims to separate the encephalic idea from its logical form based on the freedom of the cells of our organism, which seems to me, over and above any doctrine and in the light of modern scientific discoveries, just a witticism.

I send my heartfelt respects and thanks for Your “Dialogues” which are and have been for me, together with the cellular information of my organism, the reason of my reason.

Yours,

Mario Donizetti
Chapter I°
Dear Phyllis 7

Chapter II°
The Goose and The Butterfly 13

Chapter III°
God as Sole “A Priori”
Form of the Knowledge and Foundation of all Works of Art 25

Chapter IV°
Summary 47

Chapter V°
The Religious Consequences 57

NOTE 1 - LETTER TO PLATO 61
MARIO DONIZETTI is today regarded as the greatest exponent of figurative art. The Pinacoteca Ambrosiana (Ambrosiana Art Gallery) in Milan paid tribute to him with a retrospective exhibition that was held throughout the museum’s spaces. CNN International of New York devoted a documentary to him, which was broadcast all over the world. Several of his celebrated portraits have appeared on the cover of TIME magazine, including the Portrait of Pope John Paul II, which is now in the National Portrait Gallery, Smithsonian Institution of Washington. One of his most dramatic Crucifixions is among the works on display at the Treasury Museum of St. Peter’s Basilica in the Vatican. His work Commedia dell’Arte (Comedy of Art) is in the Spajani Collection in the GAMEC (Gallery of Modern and Contemporary Art), Accademia Carrara, in Bergamo.

Rigorous scientific research has enabled him to bring back techniques that had been lost for centuries, such as varnished and glazed egg tempera, invent a method for encaustic painting with an easel, and radically transform the use of pastels. He used pastels for his seven great paintings of the cycle The Deadly Sins.

To divulge his techniques, and complement the “Centro di Ricerche Tecniche dell’Arte” (Centre for Research into Art Techniques) set up in 1977 in Bergamo, Mario Donizetti opened an on-line Fine Arts Academy (www.donizetti-museoscuola.it) in 2003, which has its headquarters in Aquileia, Italy.


In these essays, to demonstrate the groundlessness of artistic formalism, he also makes use of the most recent scientific discoveries regarding the brain, stating - as Jean Louis Ferrier metaphorically wrote in “Le Point” - that “… Kant, Hegel, Croce ont introduit le ver dans le fruit de la réalité, à savoir le subjectivisme.”

Donizetti contributes to newspapers and magazines with essays on aesthetics and diagnostics of restoration.